The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law by Sitaraman, Ganesh & Wuerth, Ingrid
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2015
The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law
Ganesh Sitaraman
Ingrid Wuerth
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 Harvard Law Review. 1897 (2015)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/936
? ???? ?????
Citation: 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897 2014-2015 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Fri Dec 11 15:38:06 2015
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0017-811X
VOLUME 128 MAY 2015 NUMBER 7
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
© 2015 by The Harvard Law Review Association
ARTICLE
THE NORMALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth
CONTENTS
IN T R O D U C T IO N .......................................................................................................................... 1900
1. THE RISE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS EXCEPTIONALISM ...................................... 19o6
A. Defining Foreign Relations Exceptionalism ........................................................... 19o6
B. The Sutherland Revolution in Foreign Relations Law .............................................. 1911
II. THE THREE WAVES OF NORMALIZATION .................................................................. 1919
A. The First Wave: The End of the Cold War .................................................................. 1919
B. The Second Wave: The War on Terror ......................................................................... 192I
C. The Third W ave: The R oberts Court ............................................................................ 1924
i. Ju sticia bility ............................................................................................................... 1925
2. F ed eralism .................................................................................................................. 1 92 7
3. E xecutive D om inance ............................................................................................... 1930
D. Conclusion: The Second Revolution in Foreign Relations Law ............................... 1935
III. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AS ORDINARY LAW ........................................................ 1935
A . E xp ertise ........................................................................................................................... 193 6
B .S p eed ................................................................................................................................. 1 93 8
C . F lex ibility ......................................................................................................................... 193 9
D . S ecrecy .............................................................................................................................. 1 940
E. The Subject Matter of Foreign Affairs ......................................................................... 1942
F. U n iform ity ........................................................................................................................ 1 944
G . H igh E rror C osts ............................................................................................................. 1946
H. The Statutory Foundations of Foreign Relations ....................................................... 1946
IV. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF NORMALIZATION .................................................. 1949
A . E lim inating O utliers ....................................................................................................... 1950
B. Normalizing Separation of Powers: The Youngstown Two-Step .............................. 1951
C. D eference to the Executive Branch .............................................................................. 1958
i. Statutory Interpretation ...................................................................................... 1959
2. F act D eference ........................................................................................................... 1965
1897
1898 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 128:I897
3. Treaties and Executive Agreem ents ......................................................................... 1968
D. International Delegation as Normal Delegation .................................................... i97o
E. Normalizing Foreign Official Immunity and State Secrets ....................................... 1974
C O N C L U SIO N ............................................................................................................................... 1978
THE NORMALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth*
The defining feature of foreign relations law is that it is distinct from domestic law.
Courts have recognized that foreign affairs are political by their nature and thus
unsuited to adjudication, that state and local involvement is inappropriate in foreign
affairs, and that the President has the lead role in foreign policymaking. In other words,
they have said that foreign relations are exceptional. But foreign relations
exceptionalism - the belief that legal issues arising from foreign relations are
functionally, doctrinally, and even methodologically distinct from those arising in
domestic policy - was not always the prevailing view. In the early twentieth century, a
revolution took place in foreign relations law. Under the intellectual leadership of
Justice Sutherland, the Supreme Court adopted the idea that foreign affairs are an
exceptional sphere of policymaking, separate from domestic law and best suited to
exclusively federal, and primarily executive, control. The exceptionalist approach has
dominated foreign relations law since that time, but it has always had questionable
foundations.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a second revolution in foreign relations
law, one whose scope and significance rival the Sutherland revolution, but one that has
gone largely unrecognized. Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court
has increasingly rejected the idea that foreign affairs are different from domestic affairs.
Instead, it has started treating foreign relations issues as if they were run-of-the-mill
domestic policy issues, suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary separation
of powers and statutory interpretation principles. This "normalization" of foreign
relations law has taken place in three waves. It began with the end of the Cold War and
the rise of globalization in the i99os. It continued - counterintuitively - during the
war on terror, despite the strong case for exceptionalism in a time of exigency. And it
has proceeded, during the Roberts Court, to undermine justiciability, federalism, and
executive dominance - the very heart of exceptionalism.
This Article documents the normalization of foreign relations law over the last twenty-
five years. It demonstrates how normalization can be applied to a wide variety of
doctrines and debates in foreign relations law, ranging from the proper interpretation
of Youngstown to the applicability of administrative law doctrines in foreign affairs to
reforms in the foreign sovereign immunity and state secrets regimes. Ultimately, this
Article argues that courts and scholars should embrace normalization as the new
paradigm for foreign relations law.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Curt
Bradley, Harlan Cohen, Bill Dodge, Jean Galbraith, Aziz Huq, Jon Michaels, Jide Nzelibe, Debo-
rah Pearlstein, Eric Posner, Dave Pozen, Mike Ramsey, Peter Spiro, Kevin Stack, Paul Stephan,




9 he defining feature of foreign relations law is that it is distinct
from domestic law. In foreign relations, the need for speed and
secrecy is paramount. In foreign relations, decisions need to be uni-
form across the country In foreign relations, the Executive has special
expertise compared to courts and Congress. And because of its subject
matter, in foreign relations, one wrong turn can lead to national calam-
ity. As a result, courts have recognized that foreign relations is
political by its nature and thus unsuited to adjudication, that state and
local involvement is inappropriate, and that the President has the lead
role in foreign policymaking. 1 In other words, foreign relations is
exceptional.
Foreign relations exceptionalism - the belief that legal issues aris-
ing from foreign relations are functionally, doctrinally, and even meth-
odologically distinct from those arising in domestic policy - was not
always the prevailing view. In the late nineteenth century, courts and
commentators treated legal issues in foreign relations just as they
treated legal issues in domestic affairs: as defined by the orthodox,
formalist vision of the Constitution, driven by the specific enumerated
powers of the federal government and the reserved powers of the
states and people. But in the early twentieth century, a revolution
took place in foreign relations law. Under the intellectual leadership of
Justice Sutherland, the Supreme Court adopted the idea that foreign
affairs are an exceptional sphere of policymaking, distinct from domes-
tic law and best suited to exclusively federal, and primarily executive,
control. 2 The consequences were significant. Exceptionalism kept for-
eign relations conflicts out of the courts, through an expansive political
question doctrine. It meant the federal government trumped state and
local governments when it came to issues touching on foreign relations.
And within the federal political branches, it meant that the executive
branch had expansive authority and received considerable deference.
Over the subsequent decades, foreign relations exceptionalism became
the dominant approach to cases dealing with foreign affairs. Indeed,
scholars have even pointed out that exceptionalism was so powerful
in the decades after the New Deal that the study of the constitutional
law of foreign relations shifted from the province of constitutional law
scholars (as it had been in the nineteenth century) to that of interna-
tional law scholars. 3
1 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
2 See infra section I.B.
3 G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations,
85 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.3 (1999).
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Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a second
revolution in foreign relations law. Over the last twenty-five years, in
a series of decisions on the core areas of exceptionalism - justicia-
bility, federalism, and executive power - the Supreme Court has re-
jected the idea that foreign affairs are different from domestic affairs.
Instead, the Court has treated foreign relations issues as if they were
run-of-the-mill domestic policy issues, suitable for judicial review and
governed by ordinary separation of powers and statutory interpre-
tation principles. The result is that foreign relations law is being
normalized.
Although scholars have criticized certain aspects of exceptionalism
and have identified particular cases of normalization, the true scope
and significance of normalization has gone unrecognized. In this Arti-
cle, we argue that the normalization of foreign relations law has pro-
ceeded in three waves over the last twenty-five years, and we spell out
its implications for a variety of scholarly debates and legal doctrines.
We hope to make three contributions: First, we seek to document
the normalization of foreign relations law over the last quarter century.
In many cases, scholars and commentators have recognized when the
Court has uncharacteristically treated foreign relations cases as unex-
ceptional. 4 But to date there has not been a comprehensive account of
this trend. We believe that when viewed from the perspective of the
history and the dominance of foreign relations exceptionalism, the
three waves of normalization amount to a revolution - akin to, and in
some ways the reverse of, the Sutherland revolution in the early twen-
tieth century. In particular, because the normalization revolution has,
surprisingly, continued in both war and peace, we believe it is not a
fad, but a fundamental paradigm shift. Courts and scholars need to
adapt accordingly.
We also seek to make a comprehensive case for normalization
across foreign relations law. Our second aim is therefore to demon-
strate the weaknesses of foreign relations exceptionalism. Foreign rela-
tions exceptionalism was an innovation of the early twentieth century,
not a permanent or original part of our constitutional system. Perhaps
more importantly, as an analytic matter, foreign affairs are less distinct
from domestic affairs than exceptionalists believe. Scholars have ex-
plored this history and questioned the distinctness of foreign affairs in
a variety of areas. 5 We unite these criticisms and provide a theoretical
defense for not treating foreign relations law as exceptional.
Our third aim is to show how normalization can radiate beyond the
three core areas of foreign relations law and influence a variety of de-
4 See infra Part II.
5 See infra sections LB, H.A.
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bates in the field. We show how normalization helps clarify existing
doctrines including Youngstown;6 how it applies in scholarly debates
on the applicability of Chevron7 in foreign relations, the role of "soft
law" forms of international cooperation, and the legal framework for
international delegations; and how it suggests that foreign official im-
munity and state secrets law should be reformed.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we define foreign re-
lations exceptionalism, describe its rise in the twentieth century, and
criticize its basis and justifications. We begin by arguing that foreign
relations exceptionalism is best understood as the belief that legal is-
sues arising from foreign relations are functionally, doctrinally, and
even methodologically distinct from those arising in domestic policy.
Despite the dominance of foreign relations exceptionalism over the last
eighty years and the frequent use of the term in the scholarly litera-
ture, it remains undertheorized. In the context of the debates on
exceptionalism, we believe our definitional discussion is an indepen-
dent contribution, regardless of whether one agrees with our broader
normalization thesis. Part I then describes the rise of this framework
in the early twentieth century and its focus on three central areas:
nonjusticiability, which suggests expansive deference to the political
branches; federalism, which rejects state and local participation in for-
eign relations; and executive dominance, which allocates power within
the federal political branches to the executive.
In Part II, we describe the three waves of foreign relations normali-
zation. The first wave of normalization took place in the 199o8. With
the end of the Cold War, scholars began to challenge the prevailing
exceptionalist approach. They questioned the distinction between for-
eign and domestic affairs in an age of globalization and sought to res-
urrect federalism in foreign affairs, just as it was being revived in do-
mestic constitutional law. Unexpectedly, the Supreme Court also
refrained from applying exceptionalist reasoning in a few important
foreign relations cases. Still, the significance of the first wave of nor-
malization was primarily foundational: scholars cracked the armor of
foreign relations exceptionalism, identifying its relatively recent emer-
gence, its doctrinal problems, and its analytic failures.
The second wave of normalization began, counterintuitively, with
September ii and the war on terror. With the onset of a national se-
curity crisis and ultimately two wars, many predicted a resurgence of
foreign relations exceptionalism - which would have left the first
wave of normalization as a historical curiosity, an outlier. Indeed, the
Bush Administration seems to have expected as much, justifying many
6 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
1902 [Vol. 128:1897
NORMALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
of its war-on-terror decisions with exceptionalist legal reasoning. But
surprisingly, the war on terror did not lead to the full-throated return
of exceptionalism. Rather, it prompted the faster, deeper, and broader
normalization of foreign relations law. In Rasul v. Bush," Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 9 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 10 and Boumediene v. Bush,11 the Su-
preme Court rejected claims of nonjusticiability and expansive execu-
tive power, and instead relied on typical statutory interpretation, as
would be expected in domestic law. Scholars increasingly began to ex-
plore the applicability of administrative law doctrines and principles to
foreign affairs. Lawyers developed expertise and specialization in na-
tional security cases, particularly surrounding Guantanamo detainees.
The significance of the second wave of normalization cannot be over-
stated. In the midst of wartime exigency - perhaps the optimal con-
text for a reassertion of foreign relations exceptionalism - normaliza-
tion continued to proceed apace. Importantly, as national security and
foreign relations legal issues proliferated during the war on terror, low-
er court judges, lawyers, and scholars interacted more frequently with
foreign relations issues. Frequency leads to normalcy, and foreign rela-
tions law seemed less and less exceptional.
In the last decade, the Roberts Court has ushered in a third wave
of normalization. We give the Roberts Court's normalization efforts
an extended treatment, as they have not yet been assessed comprehen-
sively The Court has increasingly jettisoned exceptionalism in each
of its three central areas: justiciability, federalism, and executive
dominance. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton 12 and Bond v. United States13
(Bond I), cases on the political question doctrine and standing, respec-
tively, the Court rejected the exceptionalist approach and declared the
issues in those cases as suitable for adjudication. In Bond v. United
States14 (Bond II), Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,15 and Medellin
v. Texas, 16 the Court took on the federalism prong of exceptionalism,
treating state-federal relations as a matter of ordinary interpretation.
And in Medellin and a variety of statutory interpretation cases -
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,17 Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd.,' Bond II, and Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital,
8 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
9 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
10 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
11 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
12 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
13 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
14 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
15 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
16 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
17 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
18 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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Ltd. 19 - the Court refused to defer to the executive branch, challeng-
ing the principle of executive dominance. Although the full signifi-
cance of the third wave of normalization will not be clear without his-
torical distance, the Court increasingly seems to be treating separation
of powers and statutory interpretation questions similarly in the for-
eign and domestic contexts. Scholars, too, have embraced this trend,
documenting normalization in particular fields and exploring themes
that cut across foreign and domestic spheres, as if there were little rel-
evant distinction. Exceptionalism continues to wane.
This changing nature of U.S. foreign relations law raises an obvi-
ous normative question: should exceptionalism be preserved or reject-
ed? In Part III, we argue that analyzing foreign relations law as ordi-
nary law is not so threatening. In fact, the considerations that are
often cited to support exceptionalism - flexibility, speed, secrecy, the
nature of the subject matter, error costs, and the like - all operate at
far too high a level of generality. The foreign versus domestic divide is
hardly justifiable on its own terms as narrowly tailored to these under-
lying values, and exceptionalism is both over- and under-inclusive as
a proxy for these underlying functional values. Indeed, foreign affairs
law generally raises the same competing concerns that emerge in ordi-
nary domestic law and that are addressed through separation of pow-
ers, federalism, and administrative law. The weak justifications for
exceptionalism provide no reason to fear treating foreign affairs as
akin to domestic affairs. The burden, we argue, should shift to those
who prefer exceptionalism, those who prefer normalization along
the exceptionalist baseline, or those who prefer convergence - all of
which depart from the familiar domestic baseline of separation of
powers, federalism, and administrative law.
The normalization of foreign relations law is ongoing, not complete,
and in Part IV we show how normalization could be extended to other
important areas and debates in foreign relations law. First, we argue
that the Supreme Court should eliminate stray remarks and
exceptionalist arguments in its decisions on justiciability, federalism,
and executive power. After the normalization cases of the last few
decades, these outlier references are unnecessary and inappropriate.
Second, we argue for normalizing Youngstown, possibly the most fa-
mous case on the separation of powers. By distinguishing clearly be-
tween a predicate statutory interpretation question and the constitu-
tional law question, courts can normalize both. The result will be
greater use of ordinary statutory interpretation and ordinary constitu-
tional interpretation in cases raising executive power concerns. Third,
in recent years scholars have engaged in a debate on the appropriate
19 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
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level of deference to the executive branch in foreign relations cases.
This debate has turned in part on the applicability of Chevron defer-
ence, with some prominent scholars calling for Chevron to apply even
more broadly in the foreign relations context than in the domestic.
This position conflicts with normalization, and we instead argue for
the normal application of administrative law doctrines set forth in
Chevron, Skidmore,20 Seminole Rock, 21 and State Farm.22 We also ar-
gue that normal interpretive principles should apply in the context of
deference to the executive's factual determinations and interpretation
of treaties. In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued decisions
suggesting conflicting approaches to these questions. We show how
normalization would address this confusion, in part through the adop-
tion of the Skidmore and State Farm standards. Fourth, scholars have
recently been concerned with the delegation of power to international
organizations. We argue that international delegation should be seen
as similar to normal domestic delegation, and that it will not lead to
the worrying conclusions some scholars have identified. Finally, we
take on the issues of foreign official immunity and the state secrets
privilege. We argue that thinking of these fields as susceptible to ad-
ministrative action, requiring congressional delegation of rulemaking
authority or the equivalent, could readily solve ongoing debates.
These areas represent (at least some of) the unfinished business of
normalization. A brief conclusion follows.
Before turning to Part I, a few clarifications are in order. First, we
are not arguing that normalization is complete. Indeed, our efforts to
extend normalization to areas in which it has not been adopted would
themselves undermine such a broad or universal claim. Our argument
is more limited and precise, and it has descriptive, predictive, and
normative components. Descriptively, we argue that normalization is
and has been at work, slowly but surely, over the past twenty-five
years. Because these stirrings of normalization cut to the heart of for-
eign relations exceptionalism and have continued in war and peace, we
believe they are revolutionary in their significance. We therefore sus-
pect and predict that they are likely to be expanded to other areas of
foreign relations law. Normatively, we argue that the courts and
scholars should embrace the normalization trend, and we show how
they can do so.
Second, we do not seek here to explain why normalization is taking
place. We have a number of hypotheses: the perception of reduced
risk of negative foreign affairs consequences after the Cold War, schol-
20 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
21 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
22 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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arly attacks on exceptionalist doctrine, the rise of the conservative le-
gal movement, the Bush Administration's overreaching legal argu-
ments coupled with shocking uses of executive power, and the wide-
spread acceptance of Chevron. But these hypotheses are simply that; a
thorough account of the reasons for why normalization has taken root
must be left to another day.
Finally, we do not claim to be the first to challenge foreign relations
exceptionalism as a theoretical matter, or the first to suggest that cases
and doctrines are being normalized. Indeed, we gratefully recognize
the many scholars who have identified normalization in their particu-
lar fields. These scholars have, however, failed to describe the full
scope of normalization. The trend has taken place over a twenty-five
year period. It has touched many areas of law. It has continued in
war and peace. It has changed the very core of foreign relations law.
As a result of this transformation, we should no longer view foreign re-
lations as exceptional, with outlier cases that are "normal." We should
now expect "normal" treatment of foreign relations issues - and char-
acterize the remaining instances of exceptionalism as outliers. Normal-
ization is the new normal.
I. THE RISE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS EXCEPTIONALISM
A. Defining Foreign Relations Exceptionalism
While scholars have discussed foreign relations exceptionalism for
more than a decade, the meaning of the term itself remains
undertheorized, making it difficult to evaluate the practice. The term
was coined by Professor Curtis Bradley, who defined foreign relations
exceptionalism generally as the practice of "distinguish[ing] sharply
between domestic and foreign affairs. '23 The simplicity of this defini-
tion obscures the diversity of ways in which the term has been
interpreted and applied. Some of the differences in application are
based on attempts to create subcategories of exceptionalism. Thus,
some scholars have suggested there are stronger and milder versions of
23 Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 461
(1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power]; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Consti-
tution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 539 n.51 (i999) [hereinafter
Bradley, Dualist Constitution] (defining foreign affairs exceptionalism as "the view that the usual
constitutional restraints on the federal government's exercise of power do not apply in the area of
foreign affairs"); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
io8g, io96 (iggg) [hereinafter Bradley, New American] ("[Foreign affairs exceptionalism] is the
view that the federal government's foreign affairs powers are subject to a different, and generally
more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that govern its domestic powers."). Ter-
minology varies a bit. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitu-
tion, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 653 (2002) (using "foreign affairs differential"). We use the terms "for-
eign relations" and "foreign affairs" interchangeably.
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exceptionalism; 24  others have argued there are national security
exceptionalists and internationalist exceptionalists. 25 Conflict also per-
sists with regard to consistency. Some claim that exceptionalists have
been inconsistent in their exceptionalism; 26 others claim that non-
exceptionalists have been inconsistent in their non-exceptionalism.
27
Putting aside the obvious boundary problem in defining "foreign,' 28
the central analytic problem with the common definition of
exceptionalism is that it does not distinguish between those differences
that emerge from standard analysis, such as constitutional text and
original history (which we call "formalist"), and those differences that
are based instead on distinctive functional, doctrinal, or methodologi-
cal analysis. 29  Scholars sometimes criticize exceptionalism on both
formalist and functional grounds;30 and other times, they distinguish
between formal and functional grounds. 3 1 We therefore define foreign
24 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Af-
fairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (20cr) [hereinafter Young, Dual Federal-
ism]; see also id. at 176 n.245 (noting different definitions of exceptionalism).
25 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textbook Revisionism, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. IIII, II17 (2003)
(book review).
26 See, e.g., Bradley, Dualist Constitution, supra note 23, at 555.
27 See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, Treaty Termination as Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 121, 123 (2014), http://www.texaslrev.com/treaty-termination-as-foreign-affairs
-exceptionalism-response-to-curtis-bradley-treaty-termination-and-historical-gloss [http://perma.cc
/2JJ9-ERTG].
28 Indeed, we note in Part III that "foreign" and "domestic" are not so clear anymore, render-
ing exceptionalism more difficult. For this reason, we largely bracket the question of what exactly
fits into foreign relations exceptionalism. We mean to include national security law, foreign affairs
law, and immigration law, though each of these areas is contested as to its scope and to the degree
it covers "foreign" or "domestic" topics, particularly along the edges.
29 Compare Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and
Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1583 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, International Dele-
gations] ("The case for foreign affairs exceptionalism is primarily a functional one - grounded,
for example, in concerns about the need for flexibility in addressing foreign affairs problems and
the desirability of speaking with 'one voice' in interacting with the international community."),
and Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (suggesting a link between functionalist and
exceptionalist reasoning), with Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power
to "Define and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447,
533 (2000) (defining exceptionalism as "the view that the Constitution resolves disputes as to the
allocation of authority over foreign relations in a manner distinct from that used to resolve such
disputes on a domestic level" and arguing that "constitutional text, structure, history, and prece-
dent all indicate that the framers themselves were 'foreign affairs exceptionalists,' and modern
developments have only highlighted the wisdom of their approach"), and Garrick B. Pursley,
Dormancy, ioo GEO. L. 497, 56o (2012) (arguing that an instrumentalist-based decision rule that
distinguishes between domestic and foreign relations cases is not true foreign affairs
exceptionalism because courts are not "interpret[ing] the Constitution differently in foreign-affairs
cases than they do in domestic cases").
30 See, e.g., Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 29, at 1583-86 (criticizing Curtiss-
Wright's exceptionalism on both textual and functional grounds).
31 See Carlos Manual Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713,
720 (2002) ("The Constitution in some respects explicitly addresses matters of foreign affairs dif-
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relations exceptionalism to mean that domestic and foreign affairs-
related issues are analyzed in distinct ways as a matter of function,
doctrine, or methodology. Excluded from this definition are distinc-
tions between foreign and domestic powers that result from generally
applicable formalist analysis based on, for example, constitutional text
and original history. The President is the Commander in Chief, a
power that has particular significance in foreign relations. The
treatymaking process is different from the process of passing legisla-
tion. This is not exceptionalism.
We exclude these kinds of distinctions because we think they fail
to isolate what the term "foreign relations exceptionalism" attempts to
measure. The purpose of the term is not just to state that foreign and
domestic affairs are legally distinct in particular ways, but also to
evaluate whether those differences are appropriate. The term itself
sets a baseline of generally applicable analysis (that is why foreign af-
fairs can be "exceptional") and seeks to identify places where the analy-
sis of foreign affairs diverges from this baseline. If generally applica-
ble analysis of text and original history allocates foreign affairs powers
in particular ways, that allocation is still at the baseline.3 2 Assuming
an exclusively domestic affairs baseline when evaluating text and orig-
inal history would embed an objection to foreign affairs divergences
from the start. This would make it very difficult to evaluate the ap-
propriateness of treating foreign affairs differently because it conflates
debates about the text and original history with debates about func-
tional, doctrinal, or methodological concerns. The claim that the fed-
eral government must speak with "one voice," for example, is based on
both constitutional text, which is not exceptionalism, and the unique
needs of the federal government as co-equal sovereign in relation to
other countries, which is exceptionalism. We are concerned with un-
tangling these arguments and focusing on the latter. Doing so is par-
ticularly important because, as we describe in Part III, many of these
ferently from domestic matters. For example, it establishes a different method for making treaties
than for making statutes. But, where it does not, there would appear to be little justification for
resolving legal issues under wholly different standards just because they touch upon foreign af-
fairs."); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as 'Part of Our Law," 88 TEx. L. REV. 91, 140 (2009) (noting
that internationalists root treaty exceptionalism in the Supremacy Clause); see also Martin S. Fla-
herty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1277, 13o6-o 7 (1999) (arguing that text can justify Missouri v. Holland).
32 Generally applicable analysis includes stare decisis - so long as it is applied the same way
in domestic and foreign affairs cases. Contra Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign
Affairs, 6i DUKE L.J. 941, 943 (2Q12) ("Stare decisis and the law of foreign affairs seem to inhabit
entirely different jurisprudential worlds with no apparent means of communication."). Stare
decisis is itself deeply contested. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 742 (1988).
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functional arguments cannot be justified, yet they have been embraced
at times by the Court and by an important body of scholarship. 33
Functional arguments can lead to exceptionalism in doctrine and
methodology Sometimes exceptionalism appears with the application
of facially neutral doctrine in distinctive ways in foreign relations cas-
es. 34 The political question doctrine, for example, is framed in neutral
terms but has been applied to bar many foreign relations claims be-
cause those claims are said to pose unique risks. The doctrine itself is
not exceptionalist, but the claim that the doctrine should be differently
applied in foreign relations is. The purportedly distinctive functional
features of foreign relations can also lead to differences in methodolo-
gy. Some have argued, for example, that historical practice may play
an especially important role in foreign relations because it is a form of
deference to the political branches, which reflects "limitations on the
judiciary's expertise and access to information, limitations that are
thought to be especially acute in the area of foreign affairs. 35  Of
course, historical practice can play an important role in domestic con-
stitutional interpretation, too.36 But when the functional foreign rela-
tions arguments are used to justify greater reliance on historical prac-
tice in a foreign affairs case, as opposed to a domestic affairs case, that
is exceptionalism in action.
In attempting to isolate (and ultimately criticize, in Part III) func-
tional, doctrinal, and methodological exceptionalism, we do not mean
to argue that there are never any differences between the foreign and
domestic realms. There obviously are. Our point is that any particu-
lar functional analysis needs to be justified at a lower level of generali-
ty and considered as it would be in domestic affairs. For example,
federal common law is sometimes justified based on the presence of
"uniquely federal interests,' 37 that render the preemption of state law
"necessary. '38  Therefore to determine whether federal common law
33 See infra sections III.B-C; see also Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign
Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 507, 509 (2011); Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as
Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formal-
ism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153;
Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2004); Eric A. Posner &
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, i16 YALE L.J. f170, 1202 (2007).
34 Exceptionalism does not include facially neutral doctrine that has a particular impact in
foreign relations. Legislative standing doctrine, for example, bars the judicial resolution of many
foreign relations cases. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997). This doctrine thus
shapes the field of foreign relations in important ways, but is not exceptionalist.
35 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 4ff, 429 (2012).
36 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014).
37 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff




governs a particular aspect of foreign relations, such as the act of state
doctrine or immunity, courts must consider whether uniformity is im-
portant. This analysis might include foreign affairs-related consider-
ations such as the possibility of strife with other countries or the im-
pact on the development of customary international law. But note that
domestic affairs might also push courts to consider the import of uni-
formity. As a result, we do not believe that uniformity considerations
merit the expansive doctrines that accompany foreign affairs
exceptionalism, but they may be relevant and appropriate when con-
sidered in a narrow, non-exceptionalist analysis.
One objection to our definition is that it is impossible to disentan-
gle formalist arguments from exceptionalism; that is, exceptionalism
creeps into interpretations of the text and original history. We think
this proves too much. If exceptionalism means simply the different
treatment of foreign and domestic issues, even when there is a clear
textual commitment on point (for example, treaties and legislation fol-
lowing different paths toward passage), then exceptionalism loses
much of its usefulness. With respect to statutes, it is possible that
Congress delegates more power to the President in foreign than domes-
tic affairs - perhaps, in other words, Congress has internalized argu-
ments for exceptionalism. Assuming that this is true (though we are
not convinced it is), it does not necessarily follow that courts should
interpret congressional delegations of power differently in the foreign
and the domestic context. Of course, in both statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation, non-exceptionalist reasoning by the courts will
sometimes mean that the executive branch has more or different kinds
of power in foreign relations than in domestic cases. Again, this is not
exceptionalism.
Relatedly, we acknowledge that foreign relations exceptionalism
can be overt or covert. Overt exceptionalism exists when courts decide
cases on exceptionalist grounds - and say as much. But courts may
also decide foreign relations cases differently from domestic ones with-
out acknowledging that they are doing so. 3 9 While one can advocate
for the elimination of exceptionalism, it is possible that exceptionalism
will just shift into the shadows. To some extent, this is a problem, be-
cause exceptionalism could persist without being identified. But as
with scholars who have tried to evaluate whether judges are politi-
39 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095,
i io6-3i (2009) (describing "black holes" and "grey holes"- domains in which the executive is
either explicitly or implicitly exempt from legal constraints - in national security law cases); see
also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1287 (20cr) ("Contra-
ry to the Court's suggestion in Crosby, however, the Court's approach to preemption in that case
was far from ordinary.").
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cal, 40 it is possible to look at the outcomes of cases to determine if, in
the aggregate, outcomes align with what foreign relations
exceptionalism would predict. Moreover, if exceptionalist judges shift
from overt to covert exceptionalism, that itself might be significant be-
cause it would at least remove exceptionalist arguments from legal
doctrine and argument.
Finally, it is worth noting that exceptionalism can take place at the
constitutional and statutory level. Exceptionalism operates in the sep-
aration of powers realm if, for example, the President's powers are in-
terpreted differently in foreign affairs than domestic affairs, contra
generally applicable interpretive practice or specific functional justifi-
cation at a low level of generality Normalization can also apply in the
same way to executive branch decisionmaking. 4 1 After all, the State
and Defense Departments are agencies akin to more familiar domestic
agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency or Department of
Transportation. Indeed, one of normalization's features is shifting
analysis in foreign relations from exceptional constitutional law to or-
dinary administrative law and statutory interpretation arguments.
B. The Sutherland Revolution in Foreign Relations Law
Foreign relations exceptionalism was not always the norm. In the
nineteenth century, foreign relations law was not seen as distinct from
ordinary domestic law. Rather, foreign relations issues were generally
addressed "in accordance with a traditional, formal structure of consti-
tutionally delegated and reserved powers. ' '4 2 As scholars have shown,
this "orthodox" approach - although not without exceptions that be-
gan to develop in the late nineteenth century4 3 - had important im-
plications for three critical areas in foreign relations law: justiciability,
executive power, and federalism.
The foundational assumption of the orthodox approach was that
courts would treat foreign relations disputes in accordance with the
traditional constitutional limitations of enumerated federal powers and
40 See generally, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006).
41 We bracket the argument that the President should be treated as a "normal" actor, on par
with other agencies. For a discussion, see, for example, Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory
Powers to Administer the Law, io6 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 309 (2006) [hereinafter Stack, Presi-
dent's Statutory Powers]; Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, go IOWA L. REV. 539, 575-
584 (2005) [hereinafter Stack, Statutory President]; see also Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The
Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 703 (2007) (arguing
that the President does not have a non-statutory power over how executive officials who have
been statutorily delegated authority implement laws).
42 White, supra note 3, at 3.




reserved powers to the states and people. 4 4 As a result, under the or-
thodox approach, the political question doctrine was severely circum-
scribed. 45 Although nineteenth-century courts did recognize some po-
litical questions, such as the recognition of new governments and the
annexation of territory,46 the Court would not generally use the politi-
cal question doctrine as a mechanism for avoiding complex or chal-
lenging cases. Thus, when Professor Westel Willoughby wrote his
treatise on constitutional law in 1910, he could state clearly that
"[w]hen, however, private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the
court has indicated that it will not refuse to assume jurisdiction even
though questions of extreme political importance are also necessarily
involved. '47  Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the Court decided a wide array of foreign relations cases, applying the
law of prize, federal statutes, treaties, and the Constitution, with little
suggestion that these kinds of cases posed unique risks or called for ex-
ceptional treatment. 48
With respect to executive power, the general view in the late nine-
teenth century was that the President had no independent lawmaking
authority. International agreements could be concluded through ordi-
nary lawmaking (for example, by Congress adopting tariffs via its for-
eign commerce power) or through the treaty process with the advice
and consent of the Senate - both as specified in the Constitution. 49
Prize cases and issues of foreign sovereign immunity were resolved by
the courts; the executive branch neither dictated the result nor created
the law that courts were bound to follow. While nineteenth-century
courts would regularly grant deference to the executive on the question
of whether a foreign government was sovereign, they would "decide
the immunity issue as they would any other issue of common law, bas-
44 White, supra note 3, at 8-9.
45 Id. at 26.
46 Id.; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 7o U.
COLO. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (1999) (arguing that some aspects of Sutherland's theory had roots in
the Court's early nineteenth-century decisions according Congress broad power "relating to Indi-
ans, aliens, and territories").
47 2 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1009 (rgo).
48 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1863); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815);
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 11o (1814); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, ii
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See also Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial In-
volvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Docket, I14 YALE L.J.
855, 861 (2005) (concluding based on extensive empirical analysis that "in the Jay and Marshall
era the day-to-day business of the Court was foreign affairs").
49 See White, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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ing their judgments on domestic, maritime, and international law
principles. ' ' o
Finally, on the orthodox account, the allocation of foreign relations
powers to the federal government did not eviscerate the power of the
states; rather, the general understanding was that the exercise of for-
eign relations power by the federal government respected the powers
of the states under the Constitution. 51 Indeed, during the nineteenth
century, states were frequently engaged in foreign relations issues, in-
cluding extradition and retaliation against foreign countries for unfair
business practices. 52 States were also involved in setting immigration
policies; it was not until 1875 that immigration became an issue of fed-
eral regulation. 53
As Professor G. Edward White has documented, in the early twen-
tieth century the orthodox approach began to break down.54  It was
ultimately replaced by foreign relations exceptionalism. The reasons
for this change are contested and likely varied: the rise of U.S. diplo-
matic and military power on the world stage, the emergence of totali-
tarian ideologies, the composition of the Supreme Court, and the
political dynamics of the New Deal, among other things. The early
twentieth-century transformation undoubtedly had antecedents in
broader historical developments that began in the nineteenth century,
such as the President's increased use of force abroad, the overall
growth in U.S. economic power, and the plenary power doctrine. 55
And constitutional arguments for and against broad executive power
in foreign relations date back to the eighteenth century, as the
Pacificus-Helvidius debate famously illustrates. 56  Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's approach to foreign relations law unquestionably
changed in the early twentieth century.
The clearest advocate, if not the central architect, of foreign rela-
tions exceptionalism was Justice George Sutherland. Prior to joining
the Supreme Court in 1922, Sutherland served as a senator from Utah.
50 Id. at 27-28.
51 Id. at 9.
52 Id. at 23-24; see also Edward T Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1211 -4 (2000) (describing state laws that resulted in
"acute diplomatic complications," id. at 12 1 1-12, but also arguing that state negotiation with for-
eign powers was understood by some as an unconstitutional violation of the "dormant treaty pow-
er," id. at 1214).
53 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
54 See generally White, supra note 3.
55 See generally Cleveland, supra note 46; Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic
Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987 (2Q13) (describing the nineteenth-century growth in ex-
ecutive power over recognition, use of force, and international agreements).




In lectures published in 191o and I919,57 Sutherland outlined a consti-
tutional vision for foreign relations that diverged radically from the or-
thodox view. At the core of Sutherland's approach was the distinction
"between our internal and our external relations," that is, the distinc-
tion between the federal government's powers "which are exerted in its
dealings with the several states and their people" and "with the outside
world. '58  For Sutherland, the external power of government was
extraconstitutional, deriving its scope from the nature of sovereignty
itself.5 9 This theory had important implications. With respect to "in-
ternal" affairs, the traditional approach to enumerated powers operat-
ed. Congress had only the specific powers granted to it; all other pow-
ers were reserved to the states and the people. But with respect to
"external" affairs, the default rule was power in the hands of the feder-
al government, as sovereign. These powers were so broad that they
were defined only by what the Constitution "fails to negative. '60
Sutherland's theory was significant for each of the three elements
of the orthodox view. The extraconstitutional, or inherent, nature of
foreign relations power meant that the political question doctrine was
far more expansive than it had been under the orthodox approach:
deference to the federal government's policies was mandatory.6 1 Suth-
erland's position resolved an important issue of executive power as
well. Early in the twentieth century, presidents began to issue "proto-
cols": executive agreements that did not have Senate consent or ratifi-
cation.62 Sutherland's theory legitimized these agreements. Because
the power to make agreements was not "negative[d]" by the Constitu-
tion, it was inherent in the "external" powers of the federal govern-
ment. 63  Finally, Sutherland's exceptionalism transformed federalism.
Because the federal government held exclusive authority over "exter-
57 GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (IgIg)
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER]; George Sutherland, The Internal and
External Powers of the National Government, 191 N. AM. REV. 373 (igio) [hereinafter Suther-
land, Internal and External].
58 Sutherland, Internal and External, supra note 57, at 374 (emphases omitted).
59 See id. at 384; White, supra note 3, at 53.
60 SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 57, at 47.
61 White, supra note 3, at 6o-62.
62 Examples include the Boxer Protocol and protocols with China and Japan between 19o5
and 1917. See id. at 20.
63 Id. at 59 (quoting SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 57, at 47); see
also David. L. Sloss et al., Continuity and Change over Two Centuries, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 589, 591-592 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (describing the ear-
ly twentieth-century growth in executive power over foreign relations).
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nal" powers, federal power should trump state interests when foreign
affairs were at stake. 64
Once appointed to the Court, Sutherland implemented his theory in
a series of cases that provided the foundation for foreign affairs
exceptionalism. The most important case, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,65 came in 1936. At issue was the delegation
doctrine: whether a joint resolution could condition a prohibition on
selling arms and munitions during a conflict between Bolivia and Par-
aguay on a presidential proclamation finding that arms sales would be
detrimental to peace. Although the delegation probably would have
been unconstitutional in a domestic case, 66 the Court nonetheless up-
held it based on the internal/external distinction developed by Justice
Sutherland decades before.
Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright also articulated a
functional case for expansive deference to the President in foreign rela-
tions cases. "[T]he President alone," he wrote, "has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation. '67 The President knows bet-
ter "the conditions which prevail in foreign countries. '68  Unlike Con-
gress, the President has institutional resources: "agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials. '69  In foreign affairs, more-
over, "[s]ecrecy ... may be highly necessary," and "embarrassment -
perhaps serious embarrassment - is to be avoided."70
A few months later, in the 1937 case of United States v. Belmont,71
Sutherland explored the implications of the exceptionalist framework
for federalism. The Soviet government in Russia had expropriated the
assets of a Russian corporation, including those in a deposit account in
New York. 72 After the expropriation, the President recognized the So-
viet government and came to an agreement with a Russian minister
that assigned to the United States all claims by the Soviet government
against American nationals. 73  The question was whether the agree-
64 Sutherland's views on federalism are particularly interesting, given that he was one of the
"Four Horsemen" deeply opposed to federal power during the New Deal debates. See White, su-
pra note 3, at i18.
65 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
66 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935);
see also Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. i, 7-8 (1973) (explaining that based on domestic precedents the
Court's decision in Curtiss-Wright was "shaky").
67 Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
68 Id. at 320.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 3I U.S. 324 ( 937).
72 Id. at 325-26.
73 Id. at 326.
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ment, which had not been approved by a supermajority of the Senate
or otherwise passed into law, trumped New York's public policy
against confiscation of property. 4
Sutherland's first argument set the tone of the opinion: "We do not
pause to inquire whether in fact there was any policy of the State of
New York to be infringed, since we are of opinion that no state policy
can prevail against the international compact here involved. 71 5  This
was a radical position in comparison to the orthodoxy of the nine-
teenth century. In support, Sutherland relied again on his inter-
nal/external theory: "Governmental power over internal affairs is dis-
tributed between the national government and the several states.
Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is
vested exclusively in the national government. '7 6 That the agreement
was not an Article 11 treaty was irrelevant; as a sole executive agree-
ment, it had the same constitutional status and it trumped state law.
The reason was simple: "[T]he external powers of the United States are
to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies."77
Sutherland's opinions amounted to a revolution in foreign relations
law, but other decisions by the Court also arguably contributed to the
rise of foreign relations exceptionalism. The Court's 1920 decision in
Missouri v. Holland7" held that the federal government has broader
power acting pursuant to the Treaty Power than it does pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, and arguably also held that Tenth Amendment
limitations do not apply to the Treaty Power.7 9 The reasoning, like
Sutherland's, was premised on a sharp distinction between domestic
and foreign affairs, although the extent to which the opinion was a de-
parture from nineteenth-century views is contested. 0 Justice Holmes's
74 Id. at 326-27.
75 Id. at 327.
76 Id. at 330; see also id. at 331 ("As to such purposes the State of New York does not exist.").
77 Id. at 331.
78 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
79 See id. at 432, 433-35; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957); Bradley, Treaty
Power, supra note 23, at 423-26, 459.
80 See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 23, at 418. Missouri v. Holland is also consistent
with the argument that the federal government has extraconstitutional powers in foreign relations.
Cf I CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 5
(1902) (reasoning that the treatymaking power of the federal government "is derived not only from
the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution, but ... is also possessed by that Government
as an attribute of sovereignty"). The historical foundations of Missouri v. Holland are contested.
Compare Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 23, with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and
the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1075, i1o0or- (2ooo), and Michael P. van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court,
19o1-945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT r9r (David L. Sloss et al.
eds., 2011).
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opinion for the Court was famously opaque, but it seemed to rest both
on textual and exceptionalist grounds.8 1
In another development, the Supreme Court's I938 decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 2 restricted the federal courts' application of
common law and in doing so called into question the direct applicabil-
ity of international law in federal courts. Before Erie, international
law was routinely applied as general common law; after Erie, interna-
tional law had (and continues to have) no clear status in federal courts.
Some argue that Erie forecloses international law's direct application
as common law;8 3 others argue that international law survives Erie as
federal common law preemptive of state law.8 4  In either case, Erie
called into question the direct application of international law in the
U.S. legal system. And after World War I, courts rarely heard prize
cases, reducing judicial engagement with legal questions related to war
and international law. Although these two developments were not ex-
amples of foreign relations exceptionalism, they had the effect of mar-
ginalizing foreign relations and international law, contributing to their
transformation into specialized, distinctive areas of law and perhaps
also to the perception that they posed unique risks and challenges.8 5
From the 1930S forward, exceptionalism dominated foreign rela-
tions law, but not on the exact foundations that Sutherland had of-
fered. Sutherland's theory of extraconstitutional power, including his
efforts to provide historical support for his theory, came under "wither-
ing criticism" as early as the i940s . The most significant
exceptionalist arguments upon which Curtiss-Wright rested thus
quickly lost their significance. Instead, the divergent treatment of for-
eign affairs was increasingly based on functional arguments about the
exceptional nature of foreign relations, sometimes mixed with cursory
analysis of constitutional text or history. Courts applied the political
81 See Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433 ("We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to
the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.").
82 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
83 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, i1 HARV. L. REV. 81 5 ('997).
84 See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, iii HARV. L. REV. 1824
(998).
85 See Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 225 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2012) (de-
scribing the decline of international law in the work of the U.S. Supreme Court).
86 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (iggo); see also
David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, i9 CONST. COM-
MENT. 155, 190 (2002) ("Sutherland's theory of inherent presidential power stems from his bizarre
reading of Anglo-American legal history"); Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign
Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988); David M.
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE
L. 467 (1946); Lofgren, supra note 66; Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional For-
eign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (2000).
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question doctrine to limit the justiciability of foreign relations claims
and thereby preserve the political branches' ability to shape foreign
policy.87 The act of state doctrine, applied as an "enclave" of federal
common law post-Erie, was also said to facilitate the decisionmaking of
the political branches, while preventing state intrusion into the "unique-
ly federal" problems involved in "ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community."8 8 And the Supreme Court
struck down an Oregon statute that limited the inheritance rights of
nonresident aliens, not on the grounds that it was preempted by a fed-
eral statute or a treaty, but instead because "foreign policy attitudes" are
"of course ... matters for the Federal Government."8 9
Executive power flourished. Sole executive agreements increasing-
ly displaced treaties. 90 With virtually no discussion, the Supreme
Court held that the State Department's suggestions of foreign sover-
eign immunity were binding on the courts.9 1 Cases involving statutory
and constitutional interpretation in the context of military necessity
were characterized by "extreme deference" to the government. 92  The
Court's infamous decision in Korematsu v. United States93 reasoned,
for example, that "when under conditions of modern warfare our
87 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 14-18 (1992); cf
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Courts also adopted the rhetoric of
deference more generally. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 368
(2000) (acknowledging that "the 'nuances' of 'the foreign policy of the United States ... are much
more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court"' (quoting Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983) (omission in original))).
88 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424-25.
89 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1968).
90 See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
119 YALE L.J. 140 (2009) [hereinafter Hathaway, Presidential Power]; Oona A. Hathaway, Trea-
ties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117
YALE L.J. 1236 (2008).
91 See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945); Ex parte Republic of Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1943); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in
U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 931 (2011).
92 Craig Green, Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View from the War on Terror Cases, 1O5
Nw. U. L. REV. 983, loo6 (2011); see id. at 1002-o6 (describing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)); see also
Harlan Grant Cohen, "Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84
TUL. L. REV. 957 (2010). One of these cases, Ex parte Quirin, involved troubling and bizarre
behind-the-scenes conduct by Supreme Court Justices, including a meeting between Justice
Frankfurter and Secretary of War Stimson, and a memorandum containing a fictional dialogue
between Justice Frankfurter and the Nazi saboteurs. See G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter's
"Soliloquy" in Ex Parte Quirin: Nazi Sabotage & Constitutional Conundrums, 5 GREEN BAG 2D
423, 433-38 (2002). Compared to these earlier cases, the military commissions cases today seem
like business as usual. See Carlos M. Vazquez, "Not a Happy Precedent": The Story of Ex Parte
Quirin, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 218, 228, 238 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds.,
2010).
93 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger. '94 Even the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution was interpreted in light of "the traditional
deference to executive judgment '[i]n this vast external realm."'' 95 The
courts repeatedly asserted that the federal government, not the states,
had power over foreign policymaking. 96 While there were obviously
counterexamples, foreign relations exceptionalism defined foreign rela-
tions law throughout much of the twentieth century.97
II. THE THREE WAVES OF NORMALIZATION
In this Part, we argue that foreign relations is being normalized.
The normalization of foreign relations law has taken place in three
general waves: after the Cold War, during the war on terror, and under
the Roberts Court. We focus primarily on the third wave - partly be-
cause its components have not been identified in a comprehensive way,
and partly because the first wave was led by scholars (who are obvi-
ously well-acquainted with it) and the second wave focused on topics
that received considerable contemporaneous attention. Other scholars
have identified elements of normalization within each wave, but the
full scope and significance of normalization over the past quarter cen-
tury has gone unrecognized.
There have been some exceptions to normalization, and we discuss
some of them here and in Part IV. But these exceptions do not dis-
prove the general rule. Rather, while individual cases here and there
might come out in exceptional ways, with each wave over the last
twenty-five years, foreign relations law has been increasingly normal-
ized. In the aggregate, the evidence indicates a clear trend. We be-
lieve normalization has been sufficiently consistent and significant that
foreign relations law needs a paradigm shift. Normalization is now
ascendant.
A. The First Wave: The End of the Cold War
Despite widespread judicial practice and the support of leading
scholars, 98 at the end of the Cold War a few scholars began to chal-
lenge the exceptionalist view. Professor White exposed its relatively
recent historical roots. 99 Professor Bradley challenged exceptionalism's
94 Id. at 220.
95 Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).
96 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
44' (1968).
97 See Bradley, New American, supra note 23, at iogo-97.
98 See Nzelibe, supra note 33; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33.
99 White, supra note 3.
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treatment of federalism, arguing that state and local governments were
increasingly attempting to engage with foreign countries, that the Su-
preme Court had expressed an interest in reviving federalism in do-
mestic law, and that there was growing skepticism regarding the kind
of judicial lawmaking that had led to justiciability doctrines.10 0 Other
scholars challenged exceptionalism's approach to the political question
doctrine and executive power. 10 1 The rise of Alien Tort Statue litiga-
tion brought renewed scrutiny to the question of whether Erie's gen-
eral rule applied to international law, or whether international law had
survived Erie as a unique form of federal common law. 10 2 Although
the issues were different, the academic pushback against treating in-
ternational and foreign relations law as exceptional was similar. Still,
while scholars questioned the durability of the distinction between
domestic and foreign, there was no across-the-board normative
assault on exceptionalism. Some scholars (generally liberals) liked ex-
ceptionalism in the context of federalism, for example, but not when it
came to executive power. 10 3  Others (generally conservatives) seemed
to take the opposite view.10 4
The academic criticism of exceptionalism in the late 199os was bol-
stered by cases that appeared to take an increasingly formalist, less
exceptionalist approach to foreign relations.1 0 5 In Japan Whaling Ass'n
v. American Cetacean Society,10 6 the Court declined to use the political
question doctrine in a statutory interpretation case not involving sepa-
ration of powers issues.1°7 In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmen-
tal Tectonics Corp., International,108 the Court limited the scope of the
act of state doctrine. 10 9 In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board,110 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a California tax
statute that required worldwide reporting for multinational firms,"'
100 Bradley, New American, supra note 23, at 1097-104; see also Flaherty, supra note 31; Jack
L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 167o (1997);
Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999).
101 See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 87; Cleveland, supra note 46.
102 Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 83, with Koh, supra note 84.
103 See, e.g., LouIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION 195 (2d ed. 1996); see also Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 29, at 1585-86
(noting scholars who appear to accept exceptionalism in separation of powers but not federalism).
104 See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 23 (arguing against federalism-related exceptionalism,
but not against foreign relations exceptionalism as a whole).
105 Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1395 (1999).
106 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
107 See id. at 229-30.
108 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
109 See id. at 409.
110 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
111 Id. at 302-03.
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despite opposition from foreign countries 112 and precedent establishing
"dormant preemption" in foreign relations cases. 1 13  And while the
Court in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council1 14 held that Massa-
chusetts' sanctions on Burma were preempted by the federal sanctions
regime, 1 5 some scholars immediately viewed the opinion as notable for
its failure to rely on exceptionalist arguments. 116
The significance of the first wave of normalization was primarily
foundational. Scholars cracked the armor of foreign relations
exceptionalism, identifying its relatively recent emergence, its doctrinal
problems, and its analytic failures. The Supreme Court, for its part,
dipped its toe in the waters of normalization. There was not a wide-
spread belief - in the courts or among scholars - that foreign affairs
exceptionalism was dead.117 But momentum was gaining.
B. The Second Wave: The War on Terror
Then came the terrorist attacks of September iith. After 9/II,
scholars predicted that the courts would respond in exceptionalist
terms: with broad doctrines of nonjusticiability and deference to the
executive.11 When its policies were challenged in court, the govern-
112 See id. at 324 n.22 (1994) ("The governments of many of our trading partners have ex-
pressed their strong disapproval of California's method of taxation.").
113 See id. at 310. Commentators recognized the importance of the case. See, e.g., Jack Gold-
smith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 175, 212 ("Many believe that
Barclay's Bank marks the end of all dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines.").
114 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
115 Id. at 366.
116 See Goldsmith, supra note 113, at 178; Spiro, supra note 23, at 695. Scholars disagree about
the extent to which the decision was exceptionalist.
117 Indeed, there were still notable exceptionalist cases to come, for example, on preemption
and the Alien Tort Statute. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insur-
ance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 825, 912-13 (2004); Ku & Yoo, supra note 33, at 154. For a "normalization" argument on
Garamendi, see Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV.
1573 (2007).
118 Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitution-
al?, 112 YALE L.J. ioii, 1034 (2003) ("Judges, like the general public and its political leaders,
'like[] to win wars' and are sensitive to the criticism that they impede the war effort. Thus, in
states of emergency, national courts assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon to re-
view governmental actions and decisions." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COM-
MANDER IN CHIEF 91 (expanded ed. 1976))). For a useful outline of the theories that suggested
exceptionalism post-9/ri, see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 225, 231-33. For a pre- 9/1 treatment, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS
BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225 (1998) ("The laws will thus not be silent in times
of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.").
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ment naturally invoked the political question doctrine and executive
deference. 119 Normalization seemed unthinkable.
But surprisingly, the Supreme Court instead delivered an unex-
pected and remarkable series of losses for the Bush Administration
that together mark the second wave of normalization. The first two
cases, Rasul v. Bush 120 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 12 1 challenged respec-
tively executive detention of aliens at Guantanamo and of a U.S. citi-
zen held on a naval brig in South Carolina. In Rasul, the Court held
that the federal habeas statute gave Guantanamo detainees the right to
judicial review of their detention, 122 rejecting the government's argu-
ment that the conduct of foreign relations is constitutionally committed
to the political branches. 123 In Hamdi, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that it must defer to the government's conclusion - supported
by an affidavit - that Hamdi was an "enemy combatant" who could
be held without charges until the end of hostilities. 124 Again, the gov-
ernment's argument was based on the judicial obligation to defer to
executive power on both formalist and functionalist grounds. Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion responded by saying that "a state of war
is not a blank check. ' 125 The Court accordingly held that Hamdi was
entitled to notice and a hearing, rejecting the government's argument
that military necessity dictated otherwise. The exceptionalist argu-
ments available to the Court were clearly articulated by Justice Thom-
as, but his dissenting opinion was joined by no other Justice. 12 6
The Court cemented the second wave of normalization with two
decisions from the beginning of the Roberts Court. In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 127 the Court struck down the President's military commis-
sions as inconsistent with a federal statute. 128 The Court's lack of def-
erence to the executive branch was remarkable. To reach its conclu-
sion, the Court had to reject three distinct arguments offered by the
government - first, that the case was not justiciable at all under a
federal statute; second, that the commissions were consistent with the
substantive statute; and third, that the commissions were not governed
119 See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1366-77
(2009) (describing cases).
120 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
121 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
122 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
123 Brief for the Respondents at 41, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-333), 2004 WL
425739. The argument itself is not necessarily exceptionalist, but it is unclear whether the gov-
ernment relied ultimately on exceptionalist foundations or on traditional foundations when mak-
ing it.
124 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
125 Id. at 536.
126 See id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
128 Id. at 567.
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by Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions. 129  Finally, in
Boumediene v. Bush,130 the Court rejected the government's constitu-
tional argument and held that Guantanamo detainees have a consti-
tutional right to habeas corpus; 13 1 it also interpreted the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2oo5 as not providing an adequate substitute for ha-
beas. 132 The Court rejected the government's arguments that cited na-
tional security and foreign relations exigency 133
Functional concerns about the conduct of military operations did
surface briefly in an opinion denying habeas relief to Americans held
in Iraq who wanted to prevent their transfer from U.S. military custo-
dy to Iraqi custody.13 4  The focus of the Court's opinion in that case,
though, was not executive power, but instead the sovereign rights of
Iraq over Iraqi territory.135 And although the case was decided in the
government's favor, the Court's opinion begins by rejecting a statutory
interpretation argument advanced by the government that would have
limited the scope of the habeas relief.136
With the run of cases finding against the government, scholars in-
creasingly began to explore national security and military issues as if
they were "normal" issues. Some scholars picked up on the use of
statutory interpretation and argued for applying administrative law
principles to national security and foreign relations issues. 137  Others
129 See id. at 558-64.
130 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
131 Id. at 771.
132 Id. at 732-33.
133 Post-Boumediene, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on many petitions from Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees and in other national security- and terrorism-related cases, sometimes
over the objection of some Justices, arguably demonstrating a lack of interest by the majority
in clarifying the detainees' due process and habeas rights. See Stephen I. Vladeck,
The Passive -Aggressive Virtues, III COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 133-34 (2o11), http://
columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2o 10/O/I22_Vladeck.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PVY
-WYEZ]. Under this view, Boumediene was more an assertion of judicial power by the Court,
and less an actual vindication of significant rights of individual Guantanamo detainees. See id. at
140. Others have interpreted Boumediene through an administrative law lens. See Eric Berger,
Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision
Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2050-52 (2011).
134 See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 700 (2008) (noting "concerns about unwarranted judicial
intrusion into the Executive's ability to conduct military operations abroad"). Note that this case
is consistent with others in which foreign affairs exceptionalism is used to deny rights to individu-
als. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (20io); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
135 Munaf, 553 U.S. at 697-700.
136 Id. at 693-95. The government's argument was supported by Hirota v. MacArthur, 338
U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
137 See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military
Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the Na-
tional Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative




argued that normalization was taking place throughout the law of de-
tention. 138  Still others focused on the consequence of litigation for the
courts: Guantanamo Bay detainee cases, for example, had become rou-
tine in the D.C. Circuit 139 and a specialized "detainee bar" had
emerged. 1 40  And scholars frequently wrote thematic articles that cut
across domestic and foreign affairs. 141  That lawyers, judges, and
scholars were now deeply engaged with national security issues made
those issues seem less exceptional.
The second wave of normalization was particularly important be-
cause the war on terror posed the strongest possible challenge to the
normalization project. In the context of wartime exigency, in which
exceptionalist arguments should be at their strongest and in which the
executive branch relied upon those arguments, the Supreme Court con-
tinued to proceed with normalization. Equally importantly, just as na-
tional security and foreign relations legal issues proliferated during the
war on terror, lower court judges, lawyers, and scholars interacted with
these issues more frequently, normalizing them in practice. Although
incomplete, 142 the trend toward normalization was unmistakable.
C. The Third Wave: The Roberts Court
In the last decade, the Roberts Court has ushered in a third wave
of normalization. The third wave is characterized by the Court's
treatment of traditional foreign relations issues without relying on
exceptionalist reasoning. The trend of normalization in the Roberts
Court has gone largely unrecognized (and certainly has not been treat-
ed comprehensively), so we give it an extended treatment. By inter-
preting these developments as normalization, we take a different ap-
proach from Professor Harlan Cohen, who has recently argued that
changes in the Roberts Court's treatment of foreign relations cases are
the result of a shift from functionalism to formalism, motivated by the
Court's distrust of other constitutional actors, and giving rise to con-
138 See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 6o STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008); Huq, supra note 118; Gerald L.
Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. iii (review-
ing a variety of foreign relations cases, including Rasul v. Bush).
139 Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantdnamo, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. '547, 1578 (2011).
140 THE GUANTANAMO LAWYERS (Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009).
141 Examples abound. For a flavor, consider David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of
Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation
of Parties, Not Powers, 1I9 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis
Governance in the Administrative State: 9/l and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1613 (2009); and David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010).
142 The Court has, for example, denied certiorari in several Guantanamo-related cases, see su-
pra note 133, and in cases involving the state secrets privilege, see infra section l.E. Some cases
that reached the Supreme Court are best characterized as outliers with respect to the trend to-
ward normalization. See infra section IV.A.
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cerns about an "imperial Court. ' 143  We see these developments not
necessarily in terms of overreaching by the Court, but instead as a sal-
utary retreat from all three of the central components of foreign rela-
tions exceptionalism -- justiciability, federalism, and executive domi-
nance - which may empower lower courts, states, and Congress as
well as the Supreme Court.
i. Justiciability. - The political question doctrine, which prevents
courts from deciding "political" or nonjusticiable issues, has long had
special purchase in foreign relations cases. 144  Although the six-factor
Baker v. Carr145 test does not explicitly single out foreign relations cas-
es, its focus on prudential considerations such as a lack of respect for
or embarrassment to a coordinate branch of government, the need
for consistency, and the availability of judicially manageable standards
has led courts to apply it broadly in foreign relations cases. Many sep-
aration of powers disputes about foreign relations have accordingly
been deemed political questions. 14 6  Lower courts have applied this
doctrine especially generously, even in the context of statutory interpre-
tation and international law. 147
In this context, the Court's decision in Zivotofsky v. Clinton 148 is of
far-reaching significance. 149  In Zivotofsky, the government argued,
and the Court of Appeals held, that the political question doctrine pre-
vented courts from deciding if a federal statute or the State Depart-
ment's policy legally controls whether U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem
should be able to designate their birthplace on U.S. passports as "Isra-
el" (pursuant to the statute) or "Jerusalem" (as entered by the State
Department).150  The Supreme Court rejected the political question
doctrine in broad and sweeping terms. Chief Justice Roberts's opinion
143 Cohen, supra note 29.
144 See Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 941 (describing and defending the "exceptional treatment that
courts accord foreign affairs issues under the political question doctrine").
145 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
146 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 ('979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3 d 1300, 1302 (iith Cir. 2001);
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring); Lowry v.
Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 338-39 (D.D.C. 1987).
147 See, e.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3 d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); see also MICHAEL D.
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 322 (2007) (noting that dismis-
sals based on the political question doctrine are "legion among lower courts" in foreign relations
cases); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doc-
trine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 329 (2002) (arguing that the
political question doctrine remains more vibrant in foreign affairs than in other areas).
148 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
149 See Cohen, supra note 29 (arguing that "[i]n Zivotofsky, the Court reached out to decide the
case, not to resolve a circuit split nor even the claim at hand, but to bring discipline to the politi-
cal question doctrine, to give form to a functionalist doctrine, to bring ordinary judicial scrutiny
to political branch foreign affairs decisions," id. (manuscript at 52)).
150 See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424.
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for six members of the Court abandoned the multifactor Baker v. Carr
test.1 5 1  The Court also brushed aside the well-worn arguments that
foreign affairs cases pose unique risks for the judiciary and that the
political branches have adequate "nonjudicial methods of working out
their differences. '152 Without even citing Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Goldwater v. Carter (a political question doctrine case on treaty ter-
mination), and barely mentioning Baker v. Carr, Chief Justice Rob-
erts's opinion emphasized the power - and obligation - of the courts
to resolve foreign relations cases, even ones that involve difficult sepa-
ration of powers questions. 153 In stark language, he described the or-
dinary nature of the question:
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy deci-
sion of the political branches with the courts' own unmoored determina-
tion of what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be. Instead,
Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To
resolve his claim, the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky's interpretation
of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional. This is
a familiar judicial exercise.15 4
The Roberts Court also opened the door to more foreign relations
cases raising structural constitutional questions when it held in Bond
v. United States155 (Bond I) that an individual had standing to chal-
lenge, on Tenth Amendment grounds, a statute that implemented the
Chemical Weapons Convention, a major multinational treaty.1 5 6 The
Bond I case is not a doctrinal watershed like Zivotofsky, but it does
reverse some Court of Appeals decisions holding that individuals lack
standing to raise Tenth Amendment challenges.15 7 In Bond I itself, the
government conceded that the individual criminal defendant had
standing to raise the Tenth Amendment challenge to the statute.1 58
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy emphasized that in
both federalism and separation of powers cases, individuals are benefi-
ciaries of structurally divided government,1 5 9 a point the Court has
underscored in other recent domestic constitutional cases. 160 This em-
151 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
152 Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at '44' (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 1002, 104 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)).
153 See id. at 1428 (majority opinion).
154 Id. at 1427.
155 f31 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
156 Id. at 2367.
157 See id. at 2361; see also Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L.
REV. '435, '437-38 (2Q13).
158 Bond I, 131 S. Ct. at 2365-66.
159 Id. at 2364-65.
160 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2Q14) ("We recognize, of course,
that the separation of powers can serve to safeguard individual liberty .... ); id. at 2592-93
I1926 [Vol. 128:I897
NORMALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
phasis, as well as the Court's related focus on the judicial power and
obligation to resolve even difficult structural issues of statutory
and constitutional interpretation, 161 generally undercuts doctrines that
limit judicial involvement in foreign relations cases: standing, the po-
litical question doctrine, and broad deference to the executive branch.
Normalizing foreign relations law opens the courtroom doors to
important foreign relations cases previously barred on justiciability
grounds, especially those raising structural constitutional issues. To be
sure, ordinary standing doctrine, especially the restrictions it imposes
on cases brought by members of Congress, 16 2 will continue to impose
general limits on structural cases that reach the courts, including for-
eign relations cases. As described above, however, the Court has un-
questionably reduced the justiciability barriers to hearing such cases
and in doing so has rejected arguments that foreign relations
cases need exceptional treatment.
2. Federalism. - Federalism limitations are often said to apply
with less force - or not at all - in foreign relations cases, which is
another distinctive or exceptional feature of foreign relations law.163
In 1968, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute that denied inher-
itance to nonresidents who lived in countries where an inheritance
would be confiscated by the government (in other words, communist
countries). 164  The Oregon statute was not preempted by a federal
statute, but the Court nonetheless struck it down as an unconstitution-
al interference with the power of the federal government. 165 Although
the Court has not applied this form of "dormant foreign affairs
preemption" again, 166 it did hold in American Insurance Ass'n v. Gar-
amendi167 that a presidential policy of settling the claims of Holocaust
survivors through international agreements preempted a California
statute, an example of both federalism and executive power
exceptionalism. 16  The Supreme Court has also treated statutory in-
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Bond I); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2577-79 (2Q12) (citing Bond I).
161 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427-28 (2Q12); see also City of Arlington v.
FCC, '33 S. Ct. 1863, 1881-82 (2Q13) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
162 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
163 See Bradley, New American, supra note 23, at 1o93; Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 24,
at 14o; supra pp. 1915-16. For an argument that courts' evaluation of state and federal interests
does and should vary based on geopolitical circumstances, see Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, For-
eign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 728 (2Q13).
164 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
165 Id. at 441-
166 Lower courts have, however. See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3 d
io67, io76-77 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
592 F.3 d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
167 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
168 Id. at 40 1.
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terpretation differently in foreign relations cases that raise federalism
issues. The Court has suggested, for example, that there is a presump-
tion in favor of preemption in the foreign relations context, rather than
the usual presumption against preemption. 169  Even without a pre-
sumption, foreign relations statutes are sometimes interpreted gener-
ously to preempt state law. 170 While the Court declined a recent op-
portunity to revisit Missouri v. Holland, it has nonetheless taken
significant steps to normalize federalism analysis in both statutory in-
terpretation and executive preemption cases.
Start with statutory interpretation cases. In Bond v. United
States171 (Bond II) the Court analyzed the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention Implementation Act to determine whether it reached the de-
fendant's alleged conduct: attempting to poison her former friend due
to a romantic dispute. Although the Court might have construed the
statute broadly in light of the federal government's strong interest in
foreign affairs and treaty implementation, instead the Court analyzed it
like any regular statute on domestic affairs. Most significantly, for the
first time in a foreign relations case, the Court applied a federalism-
based clear statement rule to "insist on a clear indication that Congress
meant [the statute] to reach purely local crimes" and thereby intrude
on the police power of the States. 17 2  This clear statement rule was
drawn from domestic statutory interpretation cases, in particular
Gregory v. Ashcroft. 17 3
In statutory preemption cases raising foreign relations issues, the
Court has often favored preemption - whether explicitly or implicit-
ly.174 The reasoning in Bond II suggests, however, that statutory in-
terpretation in foreign relations cases ought not reflect special needs or
powers of the federal government. The Chief Justice's opinion for the
Court in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,175 an immigration case
holding that an Arizona business licensing statute was not preempted,
also eschews any foreign relations exceptionalism, instead treating the
preemption as business-as-usual, drawing on cases and doctrine inter-
preting statutes that lack any connection to foreign relations. 17 6 The
Whiting opinion included no language about broad executive and fed-
169 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (194).
170 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-74 (2000).
171 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2Q14).
172 Id. at 2081-82.
173 501 U.S. 452, 461 (iggi). The Court's decision might be viewed as exceptionalist because
interpreting the statute as inapplicable to Bond's conduct meant that the Court did not have to
reach the constitutional issue in the case and reconsider Missouri v. Holland, arguably an
exceptionalist opinion. See supra pp. ig6-i7.
174 See Crosby, 530 U.S. 363; Hines, 312 U.S. 52.
175 131 S. Ct. 968 (2011).
176 Id.
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eral authority in foreign relations cases,177 and the Court held against
the federal government.1 78 Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion also
avoided relying on broad statements of the "foreign affairs" powers of
the President and the federal government. 17 9 Apparently the Justices
did not view Whiting as a foreign relations case, but that conclusion
was far from obvious.18 0 Immigration cases have generally moved to-
ward normalization and away from the plenary power doctrine and
other exceptionalist analysis,8 1 but outliers remain. 182
Now consider cases on executive preemption of state law. Al-
though best known as a case on treaty self-execution and interpreta-
tion,18 3 Medellin v. Texas 18 4 also involved a directive by the President
ordering Texas to implement a judgment of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).18 5  The Court acknowledged that the ICJ judgment was
binding on the United States as a matter of international law but held
that the treaty provision imposing the international obligation was not
self-executing. The Court thus had to decide whether the President
could implement a non-self-executing treaty obligation as a matter of
domestic law binding on Texas courts.18 6 The Court had already held
that the President has the power to implement sole executive agree-
ments in Dames & Moore v. Regan8 7 and even the President's policy
177 Id. at 1983.
178 Id. at 1984-85.
179 Id. at 1987-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180 See Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law": The Presumption Against Preemp-
tion in the Roberts Court, 2011 SuP. CT. REV. 253, 339 ("As Rick Hills has noted, '[t]he surprising
aspect of Whiting... is that the Roberts Court's analysis of preemption was so conventional'; the
Court 'brushed aside the idea that Arizona encroached on a forbidden federal field of foreign rela-
tions law."' (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Roderick M. Hills Jr., Preemption Doc-
trine in the Roberts Court: Constitutional Dual Federalism by Another Name? (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of
Law Pub. Law Research Paper No. ii-69, 2011))).
181 See infra section IV.A. (discussing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)); see also
Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 363, 386-87 (2007) (discussing recent cases that limit the plenary power doctrine, including
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)).
182 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
183 See, e.g., David J. Bedermen, Medellfn's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J.
INT'L L. 529 (2008).
184 552 U.S. 49' (2008).
185 Id. at 498.
186 For an argument that the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties applied in Medellin does
not comport with constitutional text and history (and therefore could be characterized as
exceptionalist), see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, Grr (2008).
187 453 U.S. 654, 682-83 (i98i); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) ("The
powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of
the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States with respect to the Russian nation-
alization decrees."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (finding that an interna-
tional compact recognizing the Soviet Union could be undertaken unilaterally).
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related to such agreements in Garamendi.188 Although these cases all
involve separation of powers questions, as discussed below, they are
federalism cases as well: in all three, the key question was whether
presidential action, absent Congress, could effectively preempt or dis-
place otherwise applicable state law. In Dames & Moore and Gara-
mendi, the Court held in favor of presidential power.
In comparison with Dames & Moore and Garamendi, the power
asserted by the President in Medellin was arguably more modest, and
yet the case came out the other way. The President's claim of power
was based on an Article II treaty, a source of domestic law specifically
identified as such by the Supremacy Clause. 18 9 Still, the Court reject-
ed the government's argument, reasoning that the President lacked the
power to implement a non-self-executing treaty through a directive
that "reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and com-
pels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neu-
trally applicable state laws." 190  While the Court did not reverse
Dames & Moore and Garamendi, it distinguished the cases, limiting
the expansive presidential authority only to the narrow context of set-
tling claims. 191 As a result, the State of Texas won. The outcome and
reasoning in Medellin represented a major step in normalizing foreign
relations law. The Court did not rely on the unique needs of the Pres-
ident or the federal government, but instead applied basic separation
of powers and federalism principles. 192
3. Executive Dominance. - Executive dominance is the most dis-
tinctive and important aspect of U.S. foreign relations law. Limita-
tions on access to the courts and relaxed federalism constraints, as de-
scribed in the two prior sections, both generally result in enhanced
power of the exeutive branch. Foreign relations exceptionalism has in-
exorably led to "the increased hegemony of the Presidency and the De-
partment of State as America's principal foreign policymakers. '193
Writing in 1972 and again in 1996, Professor Louis Henkin observed
that "[s]tudents of United States government, and newspaper-readers
generally, know that U.S. foreign relations are in the charge of the
President. ' 194 In recent years, however, the Court has delivered a se-
ries of defeats to the executive branch in cases on executive power and
statutory interpretation. Building on its decision in Hamdan, the
Court has recently rejected foreign affairs exceptionalism in the sepa-
188 539 U.S. 396, 414-16 (2003).
189 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523 n.13.
190 Id. at 532.
191 See id. at 53'.
192 See id. at 525-32.
193 White, supra note 3, at 3.
194 HENKIN, supra note 103, at 31. The same language appeared in the first edition from 1972.
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ration of powers context. This dramatic normalization of U.S. foreign
relations occurred in Medellin, discussed above in the context of feder-
alism. 195 In Medellin, the President ordered the State of Texas to im-
plement a judgment of the ICJ.196 Although the judgment could have
been implemented without constitutional difficulty through either a
self-executing treaty or a statute, in this case there was neither.197 In
its amicus brief, the United States asserted that the President's actions
were justified based on implied authorization from Congress and on
his own constitutional powers in foreign affairs. 19 In a series of prior
cases, the Court had relied on strained arguments about congressional
authorization and on cursory constitutional reasoning to hold in favor
of executive power. 199 The Court had held, for example, that the Pres-
ident had the power to implement sole executive agreements in Bel-
mont 200 and in Dames & Moore,20 1 to implement the President's policy
related to such agreements in Garamendi,20 2 and to dictate the out-
come of cases against foreign sovereigns. 20 3
Yet the Chief Justice, writing for the Court in Medellin, rejected
both the government's treaty-based and constitutional arguments. The
government maintained that the treaty in question should be read as
authorizing domestic implementation by the President, or at least that
Congress had acquiesced to such implementation. The Court not only
disagreed with this argument, but it also held that by ratifying the
treaties as implicitly non-self-executing, the Senate implicitly prohibit-
ed the President from making the treaty binding on domestic courts . 2 04
This conclusion is weak. The doctrine of self-execution itself was no-
toriously unclear, to say nothing of its relationship to presidential pow-
er.20 5 The treaties were silent on the issue of self-execution, an issue
that generated disagreement among the Justices. 20 6 It is accordingly
very difficult to conclude that the Senate had any understanding of
what the fact of non-self-execution would mean for the President's ex-
195 See supra section II.C.2.
196 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
197 See id. at 505-o6.
198 Id. at 525.
199 See supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
200 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
201 453 U.S. 654, 682-83 (198).
202 539 U.S. 396, 414-r6 (2003).
203 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (r943); see also Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (r945) ("It is ... not for the courts to deny an immunity which our gov-
ernment has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has
not seen fit to recognize.").
204 Medellfn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008).
205 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695, 695-97 (1995).
206 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 514.
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ecutive power. In past cases, the Court had engaged in strained statu-
tory interpretation to find congressional authorization - but here the
strained interpretation had the effect of curtailing, not enhancing,
the President's power in a case involving "compelling" foreign policy
interests. 20 7  The Chief Justice's opinion went on to make short work
of the executive branch's constitutional argument, distinguishing
Dames & Moore and Garamendi based upon the "Executive's narrow
and strictly limited authority to settle international claims '20 and rea-
soning that even compelling foreign policy arguments do not allow the
Court to "set aside first principles" of constitutional separation of
powers.
20 9
The executive branch has not fared well in the statutory context ei-
ther. In Kiobel,210 Morrison,211 Bond JJ,212 and NML Capital,2 13 the
Court rejected the views of the executive branch. In the first two of
these cases the issue before the Court was whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality should apply to a statute - the Alien Tort
Statute in Kiobel and the Securities Exchange Act in Morrison. Al-
though the Court reached the specific outcome sought by the govern-
ment in each of these cases, it also held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to the statutes in question, contrary to the
views of the executive branch. 2 14 While the executive seems better sit-
uated than the judiciary to evaluate whether extraterritorial applica-
tion of the statute might generate foreign policy problems (one basis
for adopting the presumption215 ), and a case-by-case approach to the
reach of the statutes would afford more control to the executive
branch, foreign relations exceptionalism was nowhere to be found.
These cases are consistent with opinions from the Rehnquist Court
that afforded the executive no special deference in interpreting foreign
relations statutes. 216
The Court's opinion in NML Capital also rejected the State De-
partment's statutory interpretation - but unlike a similar decision
from a decade ago, it did not explicitly suggest that the government
would be afforded case-by-case deference to its views. The Court held
207 Id. at 524.
208 Id. at 532.
209 Id. at 524.
210 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
211 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010).
212 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
213 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014).
214 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
215 See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 ("This presumption 'serves to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord."'
(quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (99))).
216 See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004).
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that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976217 (FSIA) does not
limit the scope of discovery available against a foreign sovereign in a
post-judgment execution action. 218  The Court rejected the U.S. gov-
ernment's arguments (advanced in an amicus brief) that focused on the
negative impact such discovery could have for U.S. interests, including
potentially damaging U.S. relations with Argentina and making
the United States more vulnerable to discovery in foreign courts.2 19
The Court also rejected both the government's general argument with
respect to discovery against foreign sovereigns under the FSIA, and
the government's case-specific argument that the discovery order was
too broad.220 Unlike Republic of Austria v. Altmann,2 2 1 which also in-
terpreted the FSIA without deferring to the U.S. government's posi-
tion, NML Capital made no suggestion that the government's views
might even be entitled to case-by-case deference. 222
In some contexts the Roberts Court has eschewed multifactor bal-
ancing tests in favor of bright-line rules, in part on the grounds that
the former vest too much authority with the courts. The result has
been to further shift power toward Congress at the expense of the ex-
ecutive. This theme is prevalent in the self-execution holding of
Medellin and in Morrison and Kiobel.223 In deciding to apply the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality to the Securities Exchange Act, for
example, the Court reasoned in Morrison that "[t]he results of judicial-
speculation-made-law - divining what Congress would have wanted
if it had thought of the situation before the court - demonstrate the
wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than
guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, pre-
serving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with
predictable effects. '224  Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
dissent's analysis of treaty self-execution in Medellin, calling it "arrest-
ingly indeterminate" and ultimately based on "ad hoc judicial assess-
ment. '225  All three decisions used bright-line rules and presumptions
217 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
218 NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2258.
219 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at io, 18-22,
NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), 2014 WL 827994.
220 See NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2258.
221 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
222 Compare Altmann, 54' U.S. at 701-02, with NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2258.
223 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (discussing Con-
gress's need to explicitly write extraterritoriality into a statute). Similarly, in Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2oo6), the Court rejected suppression of evidence as a remedy for a treaty
violation, because the treaty did not explicitly provide that remedy, and because implying such a
remedy would "enlarg[e] the obligations of the United States" under the treaty, something "entirely
inconsistent with the judicial function." Id. at 346.
224 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
225 Medellfn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515 (2008).
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primarily to enhance the power of Congress, rather than that of the
President.
Normalization of foreign relations is also evident in cases that are
more likely to be characterized as administrative law cases. United
States v. Eurodif S.A., 226 for example, involved a challenge to the
Commerce Department's imposition of trade duties on imported re-
fined uranium. 227 The federal government argued that the case raised
significant national security concerns, 228 but the Court gave this view
no special deference; instead, it simply applied Chevron and held for
the government. 229 The government also argued in Eurodif that Chev-
ron applied,23 0 so the Court's reasoning was not surprising, but it does
illustrate the applicability of standard administrative law analysis in
foreign relations cases. Another example of normalization is Chief Jus-
tice Roberts's dissenting opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC,23 1 in
which he explicitly linked the Chevron "step-zero '232 inquiry in admin-
istrative law to the political question doctrine in foreign relations law.
The question in that case was whether agencies receive Chevron defer-
ence for determinations of the scope of their authority In his dissent,
the Chief Justice came down strongly in favor of careful scrutiny of the
executive branch. Acknowledging that the majority was correct that
"Chevron importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself
policymaking properly left, under the separation of powers, to the Ex-
ecutive," he nonetheless concluded in favor of "another concern at play,
no less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure," namely "the obli-
gation of the Judiciary not only to confine itself to its proper role, but
to ensure that the other branches do so as well. '23 3  He continued,
"Our duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Ex-
ecutive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the Judiciary
and the Executive"- and he then cited to Zivotofsky. 234 While the
Chief Justice wrote in dissent, he clearly saw the link between cases
that are "foreign" and "domestic."
226 555 U.S. 305 (2009).
227 Id. at 308. See generally L. Rush Atkinson, Note, Guns, Butter, and Judges: Judicial
Frameworks for Cases Implicating Security-Wealth Tradeoffs, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 587 (2010) (out-
lining a perceived shift whereby the Court applied Chevron to cases implicating national wealth
considerations that were previously adjudicated under foreign relations doctrines).
228 Brief for the United States at 22, Eurodif, 555 U.S. 305 (Nos. 07-1059, 07-1078), 2008 WL
2794014.
229 EurodifJ 555 U.S. at 316, 322.
230 Brief for the United States, supra note 228, at 18.
231 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
232 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
233 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
234 Id.
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D. Conclusion: The Second Revolution in Foreign Relations Law
Individually, the Court's decisions might not seem like much
(though many of these cases were understood immediately as signifi-
cant 235), but together the Court's decisions over the last quarter centu-
ry on political questions, standing, federalism, preemption, statutory
interpretation, and executive power form an unmistakable pattern of
normalization across the most important debates in foreign relations
law over the last century. This normalization trend is particularly sig-
nificant because it continued even in the midst of war, when one
would expect exceptionalist arguments to be at their zenith.
This pattern of treating foreign relations law as ordinary law
amounts to a second revolution in foreign relations law, on par with
the Sutherland revolution in the early twentieth century. Although the
second revolution may not reverse the particular holdings of the Suth-
erland cases, normalization is in many ways a counter-revolution be-
cause it is eliminating exceptionalist reasoning from foreign relations
law. Where the rise of exceptionalism meant nonjusticiability, normal-
ization increases the courts' involvement in adjudicating disputes.
Where the rise of exceptionalism meant federal power trumped the
states, normalization requires courts to follow routine preemption and
federalism analyses. And where the rise of exceptionalism meant ex-
pansive deference to the executive, normalization means the executive
cannot count on vague claims of foreign policy expertise to win.
III. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AS ORDINARY LAW
Perhaps the biggest concern about normalization is that treating
foreign relations as akin to ordinary domestic law would undermine
the important justifications for exceptionalism: expertise, speed, secre-
cy, flexibility, error costs, and the nature of the subject matter. In this
Part, we evaluate these justifications and show that the case for
exceptionalism is weak. Foreign affairs issues, it turns out, raise the
same competing separation of powers values that arise in the domestic
context, and the purported differences between foreign and domestic
affairs are often overstated.
235 See, e.g., Chimene Keitner, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The ATS After Kiobel: Less Bark but
More Bite?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 18, 2Q13, 12:27 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/o4/i8/kiobel
-insta-symposium-the-ats-after-kiobel-less-bark-but-more-bite [http://perma.cc/L346-NB92]; Peter
Spiro, In Other Supreme Court News: Political Question Doctrine Takes a Hit in Jerusalem Pass-
port Case, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 26, 2Q12, 11:49 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/o3/26/in-other
-supreme-court-news-political-question-doctrine-takes-a-hit-in-jerusalem-passport-case [http://
perma.cc/77P4-MMQH]; Ernie Young, Medellfin v. Texas: Another Set of Early Thoughts, OPINIO
JURIS (Mar. 25, 2008, 4:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medellin-v-texas




Perhaps the strongest justification for executive power, vis-a-vis
Congress and the courts, is that the executive branch has greater ex-
pertise on foreign affairs issues than the other branches. 236 The argu-
ment has a number of components. First, the executive simply knows
more about what is happening in other countries. 237 Second, the exec-
utive has greater institutional capacity - in terms of staff, materials,
and background - to evaluate and consider international issues. 238
Third, judges are thought to be particularly bad at addressing foreign
affairs issues because they are generalists with little expertise in the
subject matter,239 courts only engage in these issues "episodic[ally], '240
and the sources used (treaties, customary international law, etc.) are
unfamiliar. 24 1 Thus, scholars have argued that judges should defer to
executive decisions because the executive "tracks relations with foreign
states" more closely than other branches and is therefore "in a better
position to predict whether a particular act of deference to foreign in-
terests" will be beneficial or harmful to the United States. 242 Finally,
some have argued that the courts do not have the institutional compe-
tence or resources to "track the evolution of international norms that
govern the meaning of the terms" in foreign relations law. 243 On this
argument, vague terms like "declare war" change over time in interna-
tional law and practice, and the executive is best suited to interpret
these changes.
But it is not obvious how the expertise justification is different in
kind (or even in degree) from the executive's comparative expertise
in domestic affairs. It is undoubtedly true that members of the execu-
tive branch know more about events in other countries than do judges
or even Congress, but it is equally true that they know more about
food and drug policy, environmental policy, banking regulation, and
Medicare reimbursements. Nor is it satisfactory to respond that for-
eign affairs require "political" judgment rather than "technocratic"
judgment. Although there are surely gradations, it is hardly clear that
the decision to regulate smoking under the Federal Food, Drug, and
236 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1202.
237 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
238 See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 87, 128 (2009); see also Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 986.
239 See Knowles, supra note 238, at 128 (citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. '979)).
240 Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 809
(r989).
241 See id.
242 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1205.
243 Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 944.
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Cosmetic Act was "technocratic,' 244 while the negotiation and imple-
mentation of the Basel III accords on financial regulation was "politi-
cal. '245 Similarly, the executive bureaucracy has greater institutional
resources - in terms of staff, funding, and the like - to monitor and
direct foreign affairs. But this is no different from the situation in
domestic affairs. Indeed, one - if not the central - purpose and jus-
tification for the New Deal administrative state was that executive
branch bureaucrats would be expert policymakers who would have
greater competence, knowledge, and resources than members of the
other branches, and would therefore be better at setting public poli-
cy 2 4 6 And yet, in the domestic context, the legal system does not grant
ill-defined constitutional power to the executive on claims of expertise.
Rather, the Administrative Procedure Act provides a series of nuanced
processes and participatory mechanisms that at once enable and con-
strain executive branch power.
The claims of judicial incompetence are equally inapposite. If the
fact that judges are generalists should disqualify them from adjudicat-
ing foreign relations issues, it should also disqualify them from adjudi-
cating most other issues in the federal courts. A particular judge
might not hear many cases touching on foreign relations in her career,
but she also might not hear many antitrust cases, separation of powers
cases, or endangered species cases - all areas considered to be emi-
nently within the domain of the judiciary Indeed, no particular judge
is likely to be an expert in every area of law, but the structure of the
legal system assumes this, requiring attorneys to provide courts with
information. 247 To the extent that frequency of cases leads to exper-
tise, judicial incompetence is equally solvable by courts taking a more
active role in adjudicating foreign affairs issues. 24 In other words, the
normalization of foreign relations will, over time, make the judiciary
more competent than it currently is.249 Claims that the judiciary
should defer to executive branch interpretations of constitutional or in-
ternational law are particularly confusing. To the extent one believes
that terms in the Constitution are evolving, it is not clear why the ex-
244 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (200).
245 For an overview of the accords, see Basel Regulatory Framework, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/default.htm (last updated Oct.
25, 2013) [http://perma.cc/HG97-G2 ZH].
246 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15-16 (1938); see also Gerald E.
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1282-83 (1984);
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1678 (1975).
247 Charney, supra note 240, at 8og.
248 See Knowles, supra note 238, at 129; Spiro, supra note 23, at 677.
249 Indeed, this may already be happening, at least with respect to the D.C. District and Circuit
Courts' adjudication of detainee cases arising from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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ecutive branch should have greater authority to determine their evolv-
ing meaning than the judicial branch. Determining the meaning of
"declare war" over time seems hardly more complicated than deter-
mining the meaning of "cruel and unusual." This interpretive function
is at the core of what courts do. 25 0 In that light, claims of judicial in-
competence are no different than they are in domestic affairs. The an-
swer in the domestic context, however, has not been to grant expansive
deference to all executive branch actions. Rather, executive branch ac-
tions receive varying degrees of deferences2 5 1 governed by classic ad-
ministrative law cases including Chevron and Skidmore.
B. Speed
Another prominent justification for exceptionalism in foreign af-
fairs is the need for quick actions.252 The pedigree of the claim is
strong, rooted in Alexander Hamilton's famous statement that
"[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished. '253 Scholars thus argue
that speed is a "general characteristic of foreign relations, one that
makes that area particularly resistant to regulation by broad rules set
out in advance by statute or by the judiciary. '254
The problem is that speed is not a "general characteristic" of for-
eign affairs, nor is it even a distinct characteristic. Quick action might
often be necessary in matters of war and crisis, but many foreign af-
fairs issues do not require great haste. Treaty negotiations, for exam-
250 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) '37, 177 (1803).
251 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Su-
preme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court does not use a "Chevron-or-nothing approach,"
id. at io98, but rather employs a number of deferential standards including Chevron and
Skidmore).
252 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 45-47, 109 (2006) (arguing for the need for speed in
decisionmaking after a terrorist attack); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 201 (5th rev. ed.
1984) (noting "the unity of the office [of the President], its capacity for secrecy and dispatch, and
its superior sources of information; to which should be added the fact that it is always on hand
and ready for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment much of the time");
KOH, supra note 86, at iig (noting that the President's "decision-making processes can take on
degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental institution can
match"); Ku & Yoo, supra note 33, at 193 (noting that the executive is structured for speed and
secrecy in foreign affairs); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1202; John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676 (2002) ("[A] unitary executive can evaluate
threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is
far superior to any other branch.").
253 THE FEDERALIST No. 7o , at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
254 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1217.
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pie, can drag on for years; the case for executive dispatch in those cas-
es is by no means self-evident. Similarly, the need for speed is not
unique to foreign affairs. In a crisis or emergency, whether foreign or
domestic, speed might be highly prized. As Professors Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule have shown, crises implicating "foreign" and "domes-
tic" concerns actually have a similar anatomy in terms of the govern-
ment response. 255 In other words, the foreign/domestic categorization
is poorly tailored to the need for speed. A more reasonable argument
is that speed is necessary in emergencies, foreign or domestic, and less
necessary in non-emergency conditions.
C. Flexibility
A related, but distinct, justification is that foreign affairs are char-
acterized by an inherent need for flexibility.25 6 One scholar captures
the argument well: "Because the world is inherently anarchic and thus
unstable, flexibility is crucial. Because the meaning of international
law changes with subtly shifting power dynamics, the United States
must be capable of quickly altering its interpretation of laws in order
to preserve its advantage and avoid war if possible. '25 7 The flexibility
argument is predicated on certain assumptions about the background
conditions of foreign affairs, and those assumptions are problematic for
three reasons. First, people can disagree about the nature of foreign
affairs. The flexibility argument assumes a realist approach to the
world, in which global affairs are "anarchic and thus unstable. ' '25s But
not everyone views international affairs that way. Some scholars, for
example, have argued that the world is actually better divided into an
anarchic sphere and a "liberal" sphere, the latter characterized by the
rule of law, democracy, stability, and peace. 259 Exceptionalism, it fol-
lows, should apply only in the former realm. Other scholars have ar-
gued that the current international system is defined by American he-
gemony and dominance, not instability, which leads to other
conclusions altogether.260 Depending on one's diagnosis of interna-
tional affairs, the flexibility argument is more or less persuasive.
Second, even assuming that the international realm is dynamic and
unstable and that the executive's ability to be more flexible would be
useful, it is not clear how this differs from domestic affairs. The tech-
255 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 141, at 1636-39.
256 See KOH, supra note 86, at iig; Nzelibe, supra note 33, at 977; Posner & Sunstein, supra
note 33, at 1217.
257 Knowles, supra note 238, at 134.
258 Id.
259 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, io6 HARV. L. REV.
1980, 1999-2002 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL
ANSWERS (1992)).
260 See generally Knowles, supra note 238.
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nology and financial sectors, to take two examples, are extremely dy-
namic areas in domestic affairs. Yet it seems doubtful that anyone
would seriously argue that the courts should grant special, expansive
deference to the decisions of the FCC or SEC. Indeed, dynamism is
one of the typical justifications for creating regulatory agencies - and
for granting them deference under standard administrative law prac-
tices. It is not clear why foreign affairs requires greater deference. 2 61
Finally, flexibility is better understood as a value that should be op-
timized, not maximized. Given scarce decisionmaking resources, it
may be better under some conditions to make decisions earlier rather
than seek greater flexibility by postponing decisions. In a study of the
response to Hurricane Katrina, for example, Professor David Super
concludes that programs built around preserving flexibility of
decisionmaking during the crisis "failed badly through a combination
of late and defective decisions. '26 2 In contrast, programs that "devel-
oped detailed regulatory templates in advance provided quick and ef-
fective relief. '263  It is thus not obvious that flexibility, rather than
preplanning, is optimal from a decisionmaking standpoint.
D. Secrecy
Scholars and courts often suggest that foreign affairs are different
from domestic affairs in that the need for secrecy is paramount in the
former.264 But as with speed and flexibility, secrecy doesn't map neat-
ly onto foreign relations issues. As has been recognized since the time
of the Federalist Papers, the case for secrecy is perhaps strongest when
it comes to treaty negotiations and intelligence issues.265 But those is-
261 Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein also argue that flexibility is a standard justifica-
tion in the domestic regulatory realm, and they claim that they "merely extend this rationale to
foreign relations." Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1217. But their specific proposal goes
much further. Rather than seeking to apply Chevron on its own terms to foreign affairs decisions,
they want to apply Chevron-style deference to a broader set of agency actions - and they want
executive preferences to trump judicial canons of interpretation. For a full discussion of this is-
sue, see infra section IV.C, pp. 1958-70.
262 David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2011).
263 Id.
264 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("Secrecy in
respect of information gathered by [the President and his agents] may be highly necessary, and the
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results."); see also Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (ig8o) (per curiam) ("The Government has a compelling interest in protecting
both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confi-
dentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."); Nzelibe, supra
note 33, at 986; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1202.
265 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 253, at 390-9I (John Jay) ("It seldom hap-
pens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate
dispatch are sometimes requisite.... [T]here doubtless are many.., who would rely on the se-
crecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a
large popular assembly."); Pozen, supra note 141, at 277.
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sues are not coextensive with foreign affairs. In fact, secrecy does not
seem particularly relevant to a variety of issues in foreign relations -
immigration, border policies, alien tort litigation, and foreign sovereign
immunity. And at the same time, secrecy is absolutely necessary in a
variety of domestic policy issues. Law enforcement uses secrecy to
"protect[] against the disclosure of confidential sources and law en-
forcement techniques, safeguard[] the privacy of those involved in a
criminal investigation, and otherwise prevent[] interference with
a criminal investigation. '266  Secrecy is also essential to the operation
of the domestic banking system. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Commission (FDIC) keeps a secret list of troubled banks that are at
risk of failing. The purpose of secrecy in this context has nothing to
do with national security - secrecy prevents a run on the banks. 267
In sum, as a justification for foreign affairs exceptionalism, secrecy
is relatively weak. Some particular topics or issues may require great-
er secrecy, but that is true of specific areas in domestic affairs as
well. 268  To the extent secrecy is necessary, there are statutory systems
designed specifically to preserve secrecy in judicial proceedings on for-
eign affairs. 269 Moreover, to the extent that the judicially created state
secrets privilege and bar against suits that depend on the "existence of
[agents'] secret espionage relationship with the Government" are justi-
fied at all, 270 they provide no basis for foreign affairs exceptionalism
generally, and are instead best analogized to similar doctrines in do-
mestic law such as the law enforcement privilege. Although these doc-
trines have sometimes been defended and even expanded based on
exceptionalist reasoning, especially by lower courts, 27 1 it is their
266 Roberto Iraola, Congressional Oversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for Information
Relating to Federal Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REV. '559, '579 (2002)
(describing the "law enforcement privilege").
267 See Jacob Leibenluft, What's a Bank Run? And How Do You Get on the FDIC's Secret
Problem List?, SLATE (July 18, 2008, 5:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2 195524 [http://perma.cc
/ 3 GTV-T6G6].
268 See generally Pozen, supra note 141 (discussing and analyzing the need for secrecy through-
out the executive branch, not just in the context of foreign relations).
269 See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2Q12).
270 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 1o (1953);
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
271 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3 d io7o, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2oio); Al-
Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3 d 119o, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e acknowledge
the need to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely
cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena."); El-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3 d 296, 303 (4 th Cir. 2007) ("Although the state secrets privilege was devel-
oped at common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the




exceptionalist aspects that have generated the greatest controversy and
potential for abuse,27 2 as discussed below in Part IV.
E. The Subject Matter of Foreign Affairs
Another prominent argument for foreign affairs exceptionalism is
that foreign relations covers topics related to the interactions between
sovereign governments - in particular, military and diplomatic is-
sues. 2 13 These kinds of interactions are particularly unsuited to judi-
cial or even congressional involvement, the argument goes, because the
country needs to speak and act with a single voice when interacting
with foreign sovereigns.2 7 4 A related concern is that individual states
can externalize the costs of violating international law, because retalia-
tion for the offense would be visited on the nation as a whole. 275
The trouble with this approach, as some commentators have noted,
is that foreign relations is no longer limited to interactions between
sovereigns,2 76 and nation states understand that international law in-
volves a wide variety of actors and issues. Globalization and economic
integration and advances in transportation, technology, and communi-
cations have fundamentally transformed foreign relations, so that it
now engages with basic economic issues traditionally understood to be
part of domestic affairs. In a wide variety of areas, ranging from In-
ternet communications to banking regulation, governments are in-
creasingly finding it useful to cooperate to adopt common standards. 2 77
While international agreements or common standards could be seen as
"foreign relations," they do not fall within the traditional justification
of interactions between sovereigns. Indeed, corporations, interest
groups, nonprofit organizations, and other non-sovereign entities
have strong preferences on these issues and seek to participate in
272 See infra pp. 1978.
273 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 167o (1997). A variation on this argument is that foreign relations and national security
agencies work under different conditions of interest group politics, and for this reason should be
treated differently than domestic agencies. See AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JSC, AND NSC 39 (1999) (arguing, for example, that "in foreign af-
fairs, interest groups are relatively new, fluid, and weak"). Assuming that this argument is cor-
rect, it would only support judicial exceptionalism in situations where the doctrinal analysis is
based on interest group politics. Even then the analysis would need to proceed agency by agency,
and would be likely to change over time as different agencies attract different interest groups.
274 See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 953 (2or4).
275 Carlos M. Vazquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revision-
ist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1495, 1517 (2011).
276 Goldsmith, supra note 273, at 1672.
277 DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER 3-6 (2008). For an overview of the past
and future of international banking agreements, see, for example, CHRIS BRUMMER,
MINILATERALISM (2014).
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setting these standards, just as they do in comparable domestic
policymaking. 27
8
Second, international law has shifted from primarily governing in-
teractions between states to also addressing states' treatment of their
own citizens through human rights law. This is a significant change in
the subject matter of international law. While international laws gov-
erning intranational affairs could also be seen as "foreign relations,"
they too are outside the realm of interactions between sovereign gov-
ernments. 27 9  Third, as Professor Jack Goldsmith has noted, "as the
world becomes more interconnected, domestic law and activity in-
creasingly have foreign consequences, and vice versa. '2 0  In other
words, the boundary problem between foreign and domestic affairs is
a function not just of subject matter, but of consequences. 21  To be
sure, boundary problems are pervasive in the law, and the existence of
gray areas does not itself justify abandoning any attempt at making
distinctions. But as a functional matter, there needs to be a strong jus-
tification for adopting the boundary in the first place. Increasingly,
that justification seems unclear.
Finally, to the extent foreign and domestic relations do concern dif-
ferent subjects and relevant actors, it is not clear that those differences
support exceptionalist doctrine. For example, deference to the execu-
tive might be premised upon the executive branch's interaction with
foreign governments on topics of foreign affairs. As described above,
there is no reason to conclude that this interaction with foreign sover-
eigns gives the executive branch greater expertise in foreign as opposed
to domestic affairs. Even if it did, however, the diplomatic contact be-
tween executive branch officials and their foreign counterparts is in
some contexts a reason for courts not to defer because deference would
mean that State Department officials might be held responsible for
negative decisions or that they are lobbied heavily by foreign govern-
ments - precisely the dynamic that led to the FSIA. 2 2
As a second example, because of their different subjects and rele-
vant actors, the executive branch might have a higher success rate in
agenda setting and in legislative outcomes for foreign as opposed to
278 Goldsmith, supra note 273, at 1673.
279 For a discussion of this rise of human rights in the late twentieth century, see SAMUEL
MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA (2012).
280 See Goldsmith, supra note 273, at 1672.
281 For a discussion of the boundary problem, see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disre-
garding Foreign Relations Law, i16 YALE L.J. 1230, 1257-62 (2007).
282 Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien
Tort Statute, io7 AM. J. INT'L L. 6oi, 615 (2Q13); cf. John B. Bellinger III, Ruling Burdens State
Dept., NAT'L L.J., June 28, 20io, at 47 (predicting that the result of the Supreme Court's 2010
decision in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), will be to subject the State Department "to
intensive lobbying by both plaintiffs and defendants").
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domestic affairs. 2 3  If so, institutional competence analysis would ar-
gue that courts should defer less to the executive in foreign relations
than in domestic cases. 2 4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Congress
is both attentive to foreign relations issues and responsive to the execu-
tive. Congress legislates actively in the foreign relations context, for
example by repeatedly updating the FSIA, making changes to sanc-
tions legislation, and enacting annual Defense Department Authoriza-
tions. Even when it does not legislate, Congress frequently considers
doing so, as the repeated hearings around the Authorization for Use of
Military Force and National Security Agency demonstrated. Congress
has also specifically corrected many judicial decisions in the foreign re-
lations context, including decisions on the act of state doctrine, deten-
tions, military commissions, and extraterritoriality. 2 5  Empirical evi-
dence also suggests that formalism may invite legislative correction, 2 6
which could mean that text-based statutory interpretation without def-
erence to the executive branch will have similar effects.
F Uniformity
Another strong justification for foreign affairs exceptionalism is
uniformity across the country. The idea here is simple: "If we are to be
one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other na-
tions. ' '2 7 Courts have generally understood that the Constitution allo-
cates foreign relations powers to the national government and there-
fore, "at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign
283 See JON R. BOND & RICHARD FLEISHER, THE PRESIDENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE
ARENA 152-75 (i99o). Compare Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, 4 TRANS-ACTION 7,
7-14 (1966), with Richard Fleisher et al., The Demise of the Two Presidencies, 28 AM. POL. Q. 3
(2000).
284 Cf Jinks & Katyal, supra note 281, at 1254 (explaining that the risks of judicial error are
asymmetric in foreign relations law because it is easier for Congress to correct an error against the
President than an error in his favor); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, io0 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) ("A great deal turns as well on the attentiveness
of the relevant legislature; the appropriate stance toward interpretation is not the same in a sys-
tem with an attentive legislative as in a system with an inattentive one.").
285 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 (Second Hickenlooper Amendment), Pub. L. No. 88-633,
§ 30i(d)(4), 78 Stat. Io09, 1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 237o(e)(2) (2012)); see also
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733-36 (2008) (describing the congressional response to the
Supreme Court's detention-related cases); Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the legislative response to the
Court's decisions on the extraterritorial application of statutes).
286 Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 103 (2000) (describing empiri-
cal work that shows "decisions primarily based upon the 'plain meaning' of statutory text were
more likely to be overridden than decisions primarily based upon statutory purpose or policy, or
upon precedent").
287 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 253, at 260 (James Madison).
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relations must yield to the National Government's policy."2 8  The
worry is that state and local leaders might adopt parochial policies
that individually, or through a patchwork of different policies, harm
other states or the nation as a whole. 28 9  Foreign relations
exceptionalists reason from these uniformity concerns that power
should be directed not only to the national government, but also to the
President because only the President can "speak[] with one voice. '290
The uniformity justifications are perhaps stronger than many of the
others, but they too face difficulties. Consider economic policy. There
might be substantial benefits to setting policies at the national level -
to achieve uniformity in the basic elements of commercial transactions
(currency, property, contract), facilitate transportation, and enable
communication. Similarly, there are good arguments that states should
not be allowed to prefer their own citizens to those of other states, as
such "naked preferences" might impede the functioning of a national
marketplace. 291 Indeed, foreign investment might even be more likely
when there are uniform national economic policies, because uniformity
reduces the regulatory and transaction costs for foreign firms. Despite
the obvious benefits of uniformity, domestic law does not grant all
power to the federal government. Rather, there is a large body of doc-
trine on federalism and preemption that governs the situations under
which national uniformity or local differentiation operates. It is not
obvious why the same level of sophistication, within the limits of for-
mal constitutional constraints, cannot apply in foreign relations.
As to the further claim that the executive should have primacy be-
cause she alone can speak with one voice in foreign affairs, it is not
clear why this functional value should trump competing separation of
powers values. 292 Historically, the United States has never exclusively
spoken with one voice, as the Constitution explicitly splits foreign af-
fairs powers between Congress and the President. Indeed, Congress's
expansive appropriations power alone places the executive's "one
288 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003); see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2ooo); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427
n.25 (1964).
289 Goldsmith, supra note 273, at 1666.
290 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
291 For a discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689 (1984).
292 Professor Daniel Abebe has recently argued that the one-voice presumption is problematic
as between Congress and the President, and suggests that a better approach would be to have the
one-voice idea vary based on the background international context. See Daniel Abebe, One Voice




voice" claims in jeopardy; Congress can always prohibit expenditures
of funds on specific foreign affairs policy aims. 293
G. High Error Costs
One of the underlying themes in foreign relations exceptionalism is
that judicial involvement in foreign affairs issues might have extremely
high error costs. That is, there is a "fear that court decisions might
have important and indeterminate international effects detrimental to
the United States. '294 This is undoubtedly correct. Judicial decisions
on foreign affairs could adversely affect the United States and its peo-
ple. But judicial decisions on domestic affairs also have extremely
high error costs, in some cases perhaps even higher error costs. Judges
routinely decide issues that risk the safety, lives, and well-being of mil-
lions of Americans. Judges have determined the scope of peoples'
rights to physician-assisted suicide, 295 abortion and contraception,296
and firearms. 297 Judges evaluate agency actions designed to promote
clean air,298 to restrict cigarette smoking, 299 and to expand health care
to tens of millions of people (including the poor).300 A "wrong" deci-
sion in any of these cases could literally cost the lives of millions of
Americans. It is not clear why these decisions are perceived as more
or less costly than those in foreign affairs, beyond some kind of psy-
chological irrationality This is of course not to say that error costs in
foreign affairs could not be extremely high; they obviously could be.
But error costs in domestic affairs could be just as high, or even high-
er, and it is not evident, therefore, why high error costs justify extreme
judicial deference to the political branches in foreign affairs but not in
domestic affairs.
H. The Statutory Foundations of Foreign Relations
A final challenge to foreign relations exceptionalism is the perva-
sive nature of statutes in the foreign affairs and national security are-
na. First, just as in domestic affairs, virtually every aspect of the ex-
ecutive branch's conduct of foreign affairs and national security is
undertaken pursuant to statutory authorities. Entire titles of the U.S.
Code are devoted to aliens and nationality, armed forces, customs du-
293 See generally Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988); see also
generally Moore, supra note 274.
294 Charney, supra note 240, at 8ii.
295 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
296 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2o14); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
297 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
298 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
299 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
300 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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ties, foreign relations, territories and insular possessions, and war and
national defense.30 1  These statutes cover everything from the organi-
zation of the Department of Defense, 30 2 to rules governing detainee
treatment in the war on terror,30 3 to constraints on international aid
and development.30
4
Second, and perhaps more importantly given the statutory nature
of foreign affairs and national security: contrary to the conventional
wisdom, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not exempt
"[a]ll foreign affairs matters" from its purview. 30 5 In fact, the APA ad-
dresses the role of foreign and military issues in four different places.
The exceptions to APA applicability are limited. The APA defines
''agency" as "each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency. ' '306
There is no blanket foreign affairs exception; rather, in the foreign af-
fairs context, the APA exempts only "the governments of the territories
or possessions of the United States, '30 7 "courts martial and military
commissions, '308 and "military authority exercised in the field in time
of war or in occupied territory. '30 9  Note the expansive breadth of
the definition and the narrowness of the exceptions. In particular, the
APA's definition suggests clearly that military authority exercised out-
side of the field of battle even during wartime is not exempted from the
statutory definition of agency.3 10
The other exceptions are also limited. Section 552(b)(I) exempts
from notice and publicity requirements and FOIA requests issues of
"national defense or foreign policy" that are "specifically authorized
301 Respectively, titles 8, I, I9, 22, 48, and 50 of the U.S. Code.
302 1O U.S.C. § iii (2012).
303 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-i (2012).
304 See, e.g., United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of
2003, 22 U.S.C. §§ 76oi-7682 (2012).
305 Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note go, at 241-42 (emphasis added) ("All foreign af-
fairs matters - including the process of making international law - were exempted from the
Administrative Procedure Act .... ); see also id. at 221 ("The APA applies extensively to nearly
every agency decision, but it expressly exempts foreign affairs.").
306 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
307 Id. § 55I(I)(C).
308 Id. § 55i(I)(F).
309 Id. § 551(i)(G). The APA has no explicit exemption for the President, even though it ex-
pressly exempts Congress and the courts, see id. at § 551(i)(A), (B). The Supreme Court has,
however, held twice that the President is not an agency. See Dalton v. Specter, 5u1 U.S. 462, 470
(1994); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
310 Professor Kathryn Kovacs has argued that the phrases "in the field" and "time of war"
should be interpreted more broadly because they were understood to be somewhat broader during
the World War II era, when the APA was drafted. Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military
Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 725 (2010).
However, as Kovacs notes, the narrow interpretation appears to be finding favor with some
courts. Id. at 720-25.
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under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept se-
cret ... [and] are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Execu-
tive order. '3 1 1  Foreign affairs and military functions are exempted
from notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and formal adjudi-
cations,3 12 though the scope of these exemptions turns on the definition
of a "military or foreign affairs" function.3 1 3 As a matter of legislative
history and the Attorney General's contemporaneous manual on the
APA, the military and foreign affairs exception should be construed
narrowly,3 14 but judicial interpretations of these terms have been "in-
consistent," largely depending instead on "the strength of government
interests and how central foreign policy was to the administrative ac-
tion 3 15 (another manifestation of exceptionalism). As a practical mat-
ter, national security agencies have not even been consistently hostile
to following notice-and-comment procedures. The Department of De-
fense, responding to recommendations from the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States to remove the exception for rulemaking,3 16
voluntarily adopted a policy of using notice-and-comment procedures
for its regulations, barring a "significant and legitimate interest" of the
public or the Department of Defense.3 17 And importantly, foreign and
national security affairs are not exempted at all from other APA re-
quirements, such as § 7 o6(2)(A)'s provision for arbitrary and capricious
review, also known as hard look review.3 18
In sum, foreign relations law may not actually be so different from
ordinary domestic law and, when examined closely, most of the justifi-
cations for foreign relations exceptionalism are far weaker than is con-
ventionally assumed. To anticipate an objection, it is possible that the
311 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I)(A)-(B).
312 Id. § 553(a)(i) (rulemaking); id. § 554(a)(4) (adjudications). Note that military justice issues,
such as courts martial and military commissions, are addressed under a different statutory
scheme - the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1o U.S.C. §§ 8cr-946 (2Q12). For a discussion of
the notice-and-comment exception and an argument that it should be reformed, see Robert
Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883 (2014).
313 For a discussion of this issue, see Vermeule, supra note 39, at 1112 13.
314 See id. at 1112 & n.62 (citing S. REP. No. 79-752, at 13 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE AC. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 185, 199 (1946)); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
26-27, 45 ('947)-
315 Vermeule, supra note 39, at 112.
316 Elimination of the "Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from APA Rulemak-
ing Requirements, 39 Fed. Reg. 4847 (Feb. 7, 1974); see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and
Foreign Affairs Function Rule-making Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221, 225 (1972).
317 32 C.F.R. § 336.3(b) (2002) (repealed); see Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions and Ad-
ministrative Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 379, 386 n.43 (2003).
318 See Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 5 16-17 (2014).
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foreign-versus-domestic framework could be a proxy or heuristic for
how an evaluation of considerations of speed, expertise, and the like
would shake out if assessed in many cases over an extended period of
time. That is, as a matter of easy administrability, a clear rule, though
over- and under-inclusive, might be superior to greater particularity in
the analysis. Perhaps. But we think that argument is weak given the
extensive similarities between the categories and the wildly over- and
under-inclusive nature of the categories. In an era of increasing nor-
malization, we think exceptionalism's adherents need to show that
exceptionalism is on net superior to the normal domestic system gov-
erned by separation of powers, federalism, and administrative law -
or that harmonizing the foreign and domestic is appropriate, but
should be done along the exceptionalist baseline rather than the do-
mestic law baseline. It is not at all clear why courts cannot readily
apply the normal domestic approach and take functional justifications
on a case-by-case basis, rather than at an abstract and high level of
generality. Given the trend toward normalization and the weak justi-
fications for exceptionalism, we simply do not fear the alignment of
foreign affairs to the domestic baseline. In the next Part, we describe
how normalization can be further extended.
IV. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF NORMALIZATION
Although the Supreme Court's efforts at normalization have cov-
ered the central issues in foreign relations law, normalization has not
yet made it to the full universe of foreign relations cases and issues.
These areas represent the unfinished business of normalization. In this
Part, we canvass a number of illustrative areas and debates in foreign
relations law and show how normalization would apply to them. Our
aim here is not to be exhaustive across all areas of foreign relations
law; rather, we have chosen areas that tackle important issues with
cross-cutting relevance and that show how normalization can apply to
Congress, courts, and scholars.
A few clarifications. First, our argument is not that the outcome of
every exceptionalist case should have gone the other way (though we
have a few in mind that probably should have), but rather that the
reasoning behind such decisions is problematic. In particular, as de-
scribed below, we expect that normalization will lead the executive to
provide more thorough justifications for its actions (and in many cases,
provide a justification for the first time). These shifts are independent-
ly significant, even if some of the normalized cases would come out the
same way. Second, note that many of these issues operate in the lower
courts and at the subconstitutional level. The three waves of normali-
zation have largely (though not completely) taken place at the constitu-
tional level and have been driven by the Supreme Court. Much of the
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future of normalization will be statutory and much of the work of
normalization will be in application by the lower courts.
A. Eliminating Outliers
In a few stray cases, the Court has retained exceptionalism, though
it is not obvious from the cases how much turned on the exceptionalist
framing. In light of the broader trend toward normalization, we think
these cases are outliers. In the future, the Court should ignore the
exceptionalism in these cases and instead continue with the normaliza-
tion project.
First, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 3 19 the Court sug-
gested that standing might be more difficult to establish in certain
kinds of foreign relations cases,3 20 though it does not seem to have re-
lied much on this fact. In that case, journalists and lawyers challenged
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act as a violation
of their First Amendment rights. Justice Alito, writing for a five-
Justice majority, reasoned that standing requirements should be care-
fully observed when "the Judiciary has been requested to review ac-
tions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and
foreign affairs. 3 2 1 Although the briefing provided both constitutional
and functional justifications for this proposition,322 the opinion itself
did not explain why standing requirements should be more stringent in
foreign relations cases. In fact, Justice Alito's suggestion that foreign
relations cases might receive special consideration appeared to be of
little significance to the decision. The cases he cited were resolved on
standard imminence-of-harm reasoning, with no mention of unique na-
tional security or foreign affairs considerations,3 23 and the four dissent-
ing Justices gave national security and foreign affairs reasoning no
mention at all.
319 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2Q13).
320 See id. at 1147.
321 Id.
322 See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioners at ii, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. II-1025), 2Q12
WL 5078759 (warning that finding the respondents had standing would "improperly require those
courts to speculate about national-security decisions that Executive officials might make in the
discharge of Article II responsibilities, without the information, expertise, or sometimes competing
responsibilities of the Executive officials who make those decisions"); see also Brief of John D.
Ashcroft et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at ii, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. ii-
1025), 2Q12 WL 3186579 (arguing that strict standing requirements are "vitally important in the
national security context, where broad challenges have a uniquely dangerous potential to expose
sensitive information and undermine efforts to secure the peace").
323 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 221--22 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, i76-8o (1974); Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. i, 11-16 (1972)). For another recent example, see Kaplan v. Central Bank of the Islamic
Republic ofIran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185, 193 (D.D.C. 2013).
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The second outlier was a statutory preemption case. In Arizona v.
United States,324 Justice Kennedy emphasized federal control over
immigration in general, and the foreign relations consequences of re-
moval decisions in particular. Decisions "of this nature touch on for-
eign relations and must be made with one voice, '3 25 and the "dynamic
nature of relations with other countries" requires "the Executive
Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Na-
tion's foreign policy with respect to these and other realities. '3 26  In
another closely divided high-profile immigration-preemption case de-
cided just one term earlier, none of the opinions had invoked
exceptionalist language, suggesting that foreign affairs federalism had
become normalized. 32 7  Thus, the impact of Justice Kennedy's
exceptionalist language in Arizona on the outcome of the case is diffi-
cult to evaluate, a task further complicated by the Court's unclear
preemption analysis - "a sea of shifting frameworks and inconsistent
decisions. '328  Not surprisingly, commentators see Arizona as a case
of exceptionalism arising out of the domestic politics of immigration,
not as a function of its relationship to foreign affairs, 329 while others
view it as another example of the Court's generally muddled preemp-
tion case law.330 Only time will tell whether immigration exceptional-
ism will fade as foreign affairs law becomes normalized, but the
Court's language in Arizona appears out of step with the Court's
recent foreign relations decisions and relies on the weak basis on
which exceptionalism has always rested.
B. Normalizing Separation of Powers: The Youngstown Two-Step
The Supreme Court's seminal 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer3 31 both undercut and perpetuated foreign affairs
exceptionalism. To the extent the opinion has generated exceptionalist
324 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2Q12).
325 Id. at 2506-07.
326 Id. at 2499.
327 See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); Young, supra note i8o, at
340.
328 Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. I, 3 (2Q13); cf. Kerry
Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 6oi, 603 (2Q13) (noting that there is "no clear
link between [justice Kennedy's national sovereignty] analysis and the preemption holding").
329 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012
Sup. CT. REV. 31, 57 (attributing the outcome in Arizona not to the foreign relations-related as-
pects of the case but instead to what "[w]e might describe ... as a gap between formal deportabil-
ity and normative deportability - a gap that is similar, perhaps, to the gap that Bill Stuntz and
others believe exists in some parts of criminal law"); see also Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg,
Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1248 (2Q14) (ana-
lyzing Arizona as one of many examples of the role of inaction in federalism).
330 Meltzer, supra note 328, at 1o-14.
331 343 U.S. 5 79 (195 2).
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reasoning, we think it should be normalized. In one sense, the opinion
did normalize foreign relations law by rejecting both Justice Suther-
land's theory of extraconstitutional authority in foreign relations 332
and his dicta about extreme deference to the President. Not only did
the Court reach the merits of the case, but it also invalidated President
Truman's wartime seizure of steel mills in Ohio. 333 The President jus-
tified his actions based on military necessity and on his constitutional
powers in foreign relations. 334 Rejecting these arguments, the Justices
reasoned that the President's authority must come from the Constitu-
tion or an act of Congress - not from extraconstitutional sources. 335
The Youngstown case did not mark an end to exceptionalism, how-
ever. Indeed, it has served as an occasionally unrecognized and cer-
tainly unnecessary source of exceptionalism. The most influential
opinion in the case was Justice Jackson's concurrence setting out his
famous tripartite framework in which the executive branch's actions
are categorized according to whether they are authorized by Congress,
prohibited by Congress, or neither.336  Applying that framework, the
Court has sometimes read congressional enactments broadly to favor
the executive branch in foreign relations cases - more broadly than it
reads statutes outside the foreign relations context. 337  Justice Jack-
son's concurrence also interpreted the scope of the Commander in
Chief Clause in part by distinguishing between foreign and domestic
actions by the President. 338 This distinction is necessary for, but not
unique to, exceptionalism.
Another exceptionalist aspect of Youngstown is that by collapsing
constitutional and statutory interpretation into one framework, the
case appeared to put foreign relations in a special category, distinct
from the other work of administrative agencies. Although Youngstown
is not limited to foreign affairs cases, 339 this is the area in which its in-
fluence has been greatest. As Chevron and Skidmore came to define
the deference generally due to administrative agencies in statutory
interpretation, the foreign affairs-related work of the State and
Defense Departments in particular was treated differently than domes-
332 Note, however, that Justice Sutherland's theory need not be rooted in exceptionalism. If
text and history revealed an extraconstitutional power baseline to be valid, then the theory would
be built on normal, not exceptional, foundations.
333 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589.
334 See id. at 587.
335 Id. at 585.
336 See id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
337 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (ig8i); see also KOH, supra note 86,
at 138-40.
338 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) (suggesting that "the widest lati-
tude" should be given to the commander-in-chief power "when turned against the outside world
for the security of our society," but not "when it is turned inward").
339 See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
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tic agency decisions. This was partly because the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act exempts much of their work from certain statutory
requirements,3 40 so that Chevron itself applies less often. But foreign
relations cases simply ignored the possibility of Skidmore deference or
other principles that generally apply to judicial review of agency
decisionmaking.
Finally, while Justice Jackson's framework has been discussed
widely and celebrated (almost) universally,3 4 1 there still remains confu-
sion about the categories' importance, scope, and application, especial-
ly as a matter of constitutional interpretation. For example, some take
the opinion to symbolize congressional power in foreign affairs and
seem to think that it "foreclose[s] claims of implied presidential power
in foreign affairs. 3 42  Others hold that the opinion furthers expansive
executive power claims, including the "sole organ" thesis, but without
the baggage of Justice Sutherland's extraconstitutional theory3 43 Some
criticize the pragmatism of Justice Jackson's opinion3 44 as leaving little
room for originalism.3 4 5 Others have argued that the categories are not
340 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(I) (2012).
341 "Almost" because prominent contemporaries criticized Jackson's opinion. See, e.g., Edward
S. Corwin, Comment, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 53, 63 (1953) ("Justice Jackson's rather desultory opinion contains little that is of direct per-
tinence to the constitutional issue."). At least one modern commentator has criticized its merits,
though without challenging its symbolic import. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in
Youngstown's Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 104-05 (2002).
342 Bellia, supra note 341, at 9r (recounting this view). On congressional authority, see, for ex-
ample, Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J.
1385, 1410 (1989) (noting that "advocates of congressional authority look to Youngstown[] ... as
the basis for imposing limits on executive authority"); and Adam J. White, Justice Jackson's
Draft Opinions in The Steel Seizure Cases, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1107, 1122 (2006) (considering it
"obvious" that "Jackson's Youngstown opinion has long been favored by proponents of congres-
sional authority").
343 Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agree-
ments, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 698 (1998) ("Youngstown also advanced the proposition that the
President is the sole organ of foreign relations, by clearing away the doctrinal debris from Suther-
land's extra-constitutional thesis without disturbing the central holding. By removing the taint of
Sutherland's twisted logic, Youngstown preserved the core concept of Curtiss-Wright. Since
Youngstown, courts have reiterated that the President is the sole organ of foreign relations, but
rather than relying upon Sutherland's historiography, courts have justified this conclusion by ref-
erence to the geopolitical necessities of the Cold War.").
344 On functionalism in Justice Jackson's opinion, see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers
and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1522-31 & nn.55, 59 (rggr) (describing formal and
functional approaches and using Justice Black's and Justice Jackson's opinions, respectively, as
examples); Cohen, supra note 29 (manuscript at 23-24) ("[O]ne might date the birth of foreign af-
fairs functionalism to 1952 and Jackson's influential Youngstown concurrence."); and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cas-
es, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 23-24 (r998) (highlighting the formalist reasoning of Justice
Black's opinion and the functionalist strains in the concurrences and arguing that Youngstown
indicates that formalism and functionalism "are frequently and maybe typically interconnected").
345 Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. r69, 172 (2004) (highlighting Youngstown as "among the most anti-originalist
'954 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 128:1897
even a "framework for evaluating executive action. '346 And there re-
mains confusion about the roles that congressional inaction and acqui-
escence play in Justice Jackson's framework,347 largely due to the in-
terplay between Youngstown and Dames & Moore.348
Youngstown can, however, be normalized and clarified by applying
ordinary principles of administrative law, statutory interpretation, and
constitutional law. A number of scholars have argued that Justice
Jackson's Youngstown opinion does not identify how to determine in
which category to place a presidential action, 349 but this determination
is merely a question of statutory interpretation. 350  The first question
under Youngstown is whether a statute authorizes the executive action
at issue, either expressly or impliedly. This is not an extraordinary
question, unique to foreign relations law and raising profound consti-
tutional concerns. Rather, it is an ordinary statutory interpretation
question, in which there are frequently debates that turn on text, con-
gressional intent, purpose, and the like. In the domestic context, cases
abound: Does the word "harm" in the Endangered Species Act autho-
opinions in the modern canon"); Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown's
Shadow, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 29, 31 (2008).
346 Bellia, supra note 341, at 91.
347 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, I9 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 226-27
(2002) (arguing that Justice Jackson's category 2 is a second-order rule of decision that enables
inferences about congressional inaction if traditional interpretive tools like text, structure, and
original history do not yield a result); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown,
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 327 (2010) (noting that "[a]ttributing categorical significance to congres-
sional action (or inaction) - beyond assessing whether Congress has authorized or prohibited the
executive branch activity - effectively substitutes judicial for congressional judgment").
348 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Les-
sons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1311 (1988).
349 See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 341, at 133 ("[]f the very issue in dispute is what Congress in-
tended to delegate to the Executive, a court cannot simply presuppose that Congress intended its
delegation to be interpreted narrowly based solely on Justice Jackson's rhetorical choices."); Stack,
Statutory President, supra note 41, at 558 ("Justice Jackson's opinion is silent on the question of
how to judge whether a presidential act fits within the scope of an express or implied statutory
authorization."); Vermeule, supra note 39, at 1141-42 ("In a world of multiple and very vague
statutory delegations bearing on national security, foreign relations, and emergency powers, judg-
es have a great deal of freedom - not infinite freedom, of course - to assign Youngstown catego-
ries to support the decisions they want to reach, rather than reach decisions based on the Youngs-
town categories.").
350 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Interpreting Presidential Powers, 63 DUKE L.J. 347, 355
(2013) ("As Youngstown illustrates, however, an important prior question will often involve the
interpretation of a statute."); Koh, supra note 348, at 1310-13 (discussing the importance of statu-
tory interpretation in Dames & Moore and subsequent cases); Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets
Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1927-28
(2012) (observing separation of powers parallels between Youngstown and Chevron); Cass R.
Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SuP.
CT. REV. i, 29 ("While Justice Jackson concluded that the President lacked authority to seize the
steel industry, he did not specify the appropriate background principle in the face of statutory
ambiguity.").
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rize the executive to consider habitat destruction or modification as
triggering protection for endangered species? 35 1 Does the statute al-
lowing the FCC to "modify any requirement" of certain tariffs allow
the agency to get rid of tariffs altogether? 352 The answers to questions
of this sort might be fiercely contested (as they indeed were in those
two particular cases), but that changes nothing about the analysis.
They are simply run-of-the-mill statutory interpretation questions -
and they should not be blurred with the constitutional questions. 353
Thus, the issue of an "implied" authorization or prohibition is no
different than it would be in administrative law. Just as Mead, Skid-
more, and Chevron govern implied authorizations in domestic law cas-
es, so too in foreign relations cases. The court can determine whether
Congress has spoken clearly on the issue at hand, or whether the statu-
tory text is ambiguous - and it can grant the appropriate level of def-
erence to executive interpretations of ambiguous language. Familiar
subsidiary doctrines in administrative law, such as the "major ques-
tions doctrine," which holds that Congress would not intend to give
agencies authority over "major questions" without specific authoriza-
tion, 354 would apply as well. The implied authorization problem is, on
this reading, no different than the parallel issue in ordinary adminis-
trative law cases.
On this normalized reading, Justice Jackson's categories should be
interpreted as seeking to address the constitutional question, not the
statutory question, despite the fact that each category involves the in-
terplay of Congress and the President. In light of ordinary statutory
interpretation principles, consider the three categories again. If, at
Youngstown "step one," the court finds that the executive's action is
authorized by the statute, then we move to the constitutional question:
does the federal government have the constitutional power to under-
take the action? At the other extreme, if the court finds at step one
that Congress has forbidden the particular action, 355 then the constitu-
tional question is whether the President has Article II powers that are
preclusive. In the middle, of course, are cases where, at step one, the
court finds there is simply no statutory guidance; we will come back to
that momentarily
Starting with statutory interpretation and then moving to constitu-
tional analysis clarifies the Youngstown framework and also shows that
351 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995).
352 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 221 (1994) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
353 See Stack, Statutory President, supra note 41, at 575-79.
354 See Sunstein, supra note 232, at 240-42 (discussing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
355 In the domestic context, think Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120.
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it is not necessarily exceptionalist. Take the debate about whether the
Youngstown approach is pro-congressional or pro-executive power.
The analysis within Justice Jackson's framework is neither. At the
statutory level, the interpretation of the provision should be handled
like other questions of statutory interpretation that involve executive
power. At the constitutional level, the framework is likewise agnostic.
As a formal matter, Justice Jackson's categories take no position on
theories of constitutional interpretation. Within the Youngstown
framework Justices could decide, for example, the scope of a preclusive
Article II power based on any kind of methodology. Some might pre-
fer originalism; others will look to historical practice. But again, there
is not necessarily anything exceptionalist about this - unless a differ-
ent method of interpretation is selected because the case is categorized
as one related to foreign affairs.
Now consider category 2, which seems to be the source of the most
confusion. It is worth quoting in its entirety:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or de-
nial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congres-
sional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a prac-
tical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential re-
sponsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.3 56
First, as to the interpretive methodology point, although Justice
Jackson might be read as suggesting that "congressional inertia, indif-
ference or quiescence" are part of constitutional interpretation, he does
not actually commit to a particular methodology. Rather, he speaks
here from the external point of view, 357 describing how cases might
come out "as a practical matter." Indeed, his footnote to this para-
graph references Lincoln's habeas decision and notes the Court's dif-
fering views during and after the Civil War.358 Even in category 2
then, as a formal matter, any methodological approach could be ap-
356 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
357 By external point of view, we do not mean to get into jurisprudential debates, particularly
those swirling around the meaning of the internal point of view in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994). Rather, we use this phrase in a social science sense: Justice Jackson's
category 2 seeks to explain the real world, not operate within a professional practice. For discus-
sions of the jurisprudential and sociological elements, see Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal
Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. ff57 (2006); and Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Inter-
nal/External Distinction and the Notion of a "Practice" in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies,
30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 163 (1996).
358 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 n.3 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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plied. Foreign relations generally, and Youngstown specifically, do not
require following historical practice, originalism, or anything else.
Second, category 2 's reference to "congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence," along with category 3's reference to the "implied will of
Congress, '35 9 has led to debate about the role of congressional inac-
tion. 360 As a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation, there is an
ongoing debate about legislative inaction, or pre- and post-enactment
legislative history (as it is sometimes called).361 Reliance upon legisla-
tive inaction will simply depend on one's preferred approach to statu-
tory interpretation; under the normalization approach, the fact that
foreign relations are involved should have nothing to do with it. Simi-
larly, within constitutional debate, the inferences drawn from legisla-
tive inaction are simply a matter of the preferred method of constitu-
tional interpretation. For those who like to look at historical practice,
it might be relevant, just as it would be in a domestic separation of
powers case. 362 For those who prefer originalism, it would not be rele-
vant - again, just as in a domestic separation of powers case. 363
This normalized approach also clarifies where the most prominent
exceptionalist Youngstown case, Dames & Moore, goes wrong. The
case has been criticized for too readily inferring congressional authori-
zation from legislative silence. 364 We do not take a position on this
question, but argue instead that the opinion went wrong by blurring
the lines between statutory and constitutional interpretation. Indeed,
the Court did not even clearly assign the case to one of the three
Youngstown categories. On the normalized theory of Youngstown,
Dames & Moore's reasoning is problematic. As a matter of ordinary
statutory interpretation, the Court had three avenues open to it. First,
it could have read the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act 365 (JEEPA) and the Hostage Act 3 66 to authorize the President's ac-
tion, putting the case in category i. Second, the Court could have
found that the statutes did not authorize the action, putting the case in
category 3. Third, it could have put the case in category 2. After these
statutory determinations, then the Court would have resolved the ap-
propriate constitutional question, depending on the category. In cate-
gories 2 and 3, the Court must resolve an Article II question; regular
359 Id. at 637.
360 Swaine, supra note 347, for example, says that the "implied will" language "asks about
nonstatutory activity, including congressional inaction." Id. at 293.
361 See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 364-65 (2011); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
362 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2Q14).
363 See, e.g., id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
364 See KOH, supra note 86, at 138-40.
365 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2Q12).
366 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2o12).
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constitutional interpretation methods should have applied. The Court
would ask whether the President had power independent of or shared
with Congress, or for category 3, whether he had preclusive power.
Congressional practice - the implicit approval of claim settlement his-
torically - could be relevant for either of these inquiries, but only if a
historical gloss 367 normally informs the constitutional question. The
Court did not take any of these three approaches. Instead, it blurred
the statutory and constitutional questions by claiming that the IEEPA
and other statutes at once did not authorize the President's action but
nonetheless indicated a "general" congressional intent to authorize such
actions. 368 A normal approach to statutory and constitutional interpre-
tation would have made the decision more persuasive, whichever way
the Court ultimately decided.
C. Deference to the Executive Branch
The deference that courts should afford to executive branch inter-
pretations of statutes, treaties, and executive agreements is a core but
unsettled issue in foreign relations law. This analysis too would bene-
fit from normalization, as would the question of deference afforded to
factual determinations related to foreign relations. With respect
to statutory interpretation, unless Chevron formally applies, it is un-
clear what deference courts should give to the executive branch and
whether that deference is different for case-specific issues as opposed
to general interpretive questions.369 For treaty interpretation, courts
ostensibly give "great weight" to the views of the executive branch -
except that sometimes they do not, and it is unclear why "great
weight" should be afforded at all.370 Finally, the executive branch of-
ten makes factual determinations of one kind or another, such as a de-
termination about the risks of a particular foreign policy decision -
for example, the likelihood that detainees transferred to Iraqi prisons
will be tortured.37 1 Sometimes the Court defers, but in other cases it
does not.
In recent years, the scholarly debate over the level of deference to
give the executive branch in foreign relations has turned toward im-
porting "ordinary" administrative law principles into foreign relations
law.37 2 We welcome the analogy, but we do not think it has been tak-
367 See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 35.
368 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-82, 686 (ig8i).
369 See Wuerth, supra note 282, at 614.
370 See infra pp. 1968-7o.
371 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702-03 (2008).
372 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649
(2000); Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note go; Jinks & Katyal, supra note 281; Deborah N.
Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 783 (2011); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33; Sitaraman, supra note 318; Sunstein, supra
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en far enough. Scholars writing in this vein have hesitated to normal-
ize foreign relations deference wholeheartedly On a normalization
approach, standard administrative law doctrines and principles would
apply to foreign relations issues across the board.37 3  Doing so would
push an executive desiring deference to provide sound reasons for its
decisions. 37 4
i. Statutory Interpretation. - Normalizing deference to the execu-
tive branch involves adopting administrative law's deference doctrines
on their own terms. The black-letter rules are well known. Under
Mead,375 when an agency has been delegated authority and exercises
that authority to interpret the statute, and that interpretation has the
force of law, then the interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference. 37 6
Per Chevron's familiar two-step process, the Court first asks whether
the statute speaks to the precise issue clearly, and if not, the Court then
defers to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. 377
When the agency's interpretation does not have the force of law, it
is eligible for Skidmore37  deference. 37 9  Under Skidmore, the Court
retains interpretive power, but grants weight to the executive's inter-
pretation - not because of the statutory authority of the agency, but
because of the agency's comparative institutional competence. 3 0  As
Justice Jackson (notably, the author of the Youngstown categories)
wrote, the views of the agency:
[C]onstitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earli-
note 137; Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J.
1927 (2003).
373 Note that there are some distinctions as a matter of generally applicable interpretation. For
example, the APA exempts foreign affairs rulemaking from notice-and-comment procedures. 5
U.S.C. § 553(a)(I) (2012). Normalization does not mean ignoring the statutory distinction, but it
also does not suggest adding to it.
374 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Proce-
dural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARv. L. REV.
528, 530 (2006) (discussing the substitutability of "textual plausibility and procedural formality of
agency interpretive decisions").
375 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
376 Id. at 226-27. For those who would normalize presidential power vis-a-vis agencies, the
critical issue might turn just on whether the President's action has the force of law, not on the
delegation question that is common in the traditional administrative law context. See Stack,
Statutory President, supra note 41, at 597 (arguing that the President should get Chevron defer-
ence as long as his action is binding).
377 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
378 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
379 Mead, 533 U.S. at 243-45.
380 See Peter L. Strauss, Essay, "Deference" Is Too Confusing - Let's Call Them "Chevron
Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145-46 (2012).
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er and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.
38 1
Between the decisions in Skidmore and Mead, the Court expanded
on these persuasive factors, and scholars have distilled them down to
five doctrinal elements: "thoroughness, formality, validity, consistency,
and agency expertise. '3 2  Courts, based on evidence from empirical
studies, seem to evaluate these factors on a case-by-case basis, granting
a sliding scale of Skidmore deference, as warranted.3 3
Foreign relations law includes a variety of areas in which the exec-
utive branch has interpretive opinions but in which an administrative
action is not at issue, such as the interpretation of the FSIA or the Al-
ien Tort Statute. 3 4 Under the standard administrative law approach,
situations like these (an agency interpretation without an agency ac-
tion) would not technically receive Skidmore deference. But it turns
out that it is not unique to foreign relations for the executive branch to
have opinions about statutory interpretation in cases between private
parties. In bankruptcy cases and ERISA cases, for example, the Su-
preme Court frequently requests amicus briefs from the Solicitor Gen-
eral, inquiring into the position of the government on statutory mean-
ing, even though the cases might not involve government action. In
these cases, the Court grants what Professor William Eskridge and
Lauren Baer have called "consultative deference,' 3 5 which they argue
is effectively the same as Skidmore deference. 3 6
We agree with that characterization and while we recognize the
two situations are technically different, we think it makes sense func-
tionally not to distinguish between Skidmore on the one hand and con-
sultative deference on the other and instead to simply characterize
both as Skidmore deference. Thus, Skidmore would apply in both the
classic situation (such as Mead) where the agency is delegated lawmak-
ing authority but has not exercised it through notice-and-comment
rulemaking (that is, it has not given its interpretation the force of law)
and in the currently doctrinally distinct situations in which the agency
has not been delegated authority at all. 3 7 Although there may be sig-
nificant differences in the expertise the agency has to offer, that dis-
381 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
382 Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1259 (2007). Hickman and Krueger note that "longevity and contem-
poraneity" might together comprise an important sixth factor. Id.
383 See id.
384 Posner and Sunstein use these examples. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1 i8o.
385 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 251, at ii.
386 Id. at I 113.
387 We distinguish here between when the agency exercises the authority and when the Presi-
dent exercises the authority, and bracket the question of what the President's constitutional pow-
ers are in such cases. See supra note 41.
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tinction is captured in the Skidmore analysis itself, in which the
amount of deference depends in part on the expertise of the agency on
the particular issue in question. This combined approach is better
than maintaining the two categories because it is unclear how the two
categories are different as a functional matter, and because Skidmore
captures the relevant considerations by focusing the courts on the insti-
tutional competence advantage that an agency may (or may not)
have. 388
Moreover, our approach is consistent with the Court's recent cases
in an important way: the third wave of normalization has clearly re-
jected the "Chevronizing" approach to many statutory interpretation
questions in foreign relations cases. 3 9 In light of these recent cases,
what sort of deference is executive branch statutory interpretation
due? If not Skidmore, then presumably it is due merely "consultative
deference." But to the extent there is a difference between Skidmore
and consultative deference, the latter undervalues the potential exper-
tise that an agency may bring to a foreign relations-related issue, even
in contexts in which Skidmore has not traditionally applied, such as
the interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute or treaty interpretation.
One might attempt to have a variety of deference regimes short of
Chevron with treaties in one category, consultative deference in anoth-
er, Skidmore in another, and fact-based deference in perhaps another.
All involve slightly different factors that speak for or against defer-
ence. We think it preferable, however, to acknowledge that the same
set of overarching concerns about expertise, accountability, and ade-
quacy of executive branch process are at work in all of these examples,
and we agree with Eskridge and Baer that simplification is not only
preferable but also readily doable.3 90 Finally, even as a matter of doc-
trine, current case law does not foreclose the application of Skidmore
to this broader category of cases.
Other scholars have suggested using an administrative law ap-
proach to deference in foreign relations cases, but their proposals re-
main exceptionalist. Although Professor Bradley was the first to argue
directly for the use of Chevron in foreign relations cases, 39 1 his ap-
proach was not to apply Chevron directly but instead to use a "Chev-
ron perspective, ' 39 2 in which the deference doctrine would apply not
388 For a discussion of how courts have implemented Skidmore by reviewing the various factors
in the test, see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 382.
389 See Ingrid Wuerth, Chief Justice Roberts: De-Chevronizing U.S. Foreign Relations Law,
LAWFARE (May r6, 2o14, 8:35 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2or4/o5/chief-justice-roberts-de
-chevronizing-u-s-foreign-relations-law [http://perma.cc/4UZU-XGP2].
390 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 251, at 1183-89.
391 See generally Bradley, supra note 372.
392 Id. at 651.
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just according to its own terms, but analogously to other situations as
well. This led him, for example, to suggest that Chevron should apply
to treaty interpretation (a conclusion with which we, along with some
other commentators, 393 disagree).
Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have likewise applied a
Chevron approach to foreign relations questions, though they take def-
erence further than Bradley. Posner and Sunstein would apply Chev-
ron more broadly in foreign than domestic affairs - classic
exceptionalism. Based on the comparative institutional competence
arguments that we reject above, they advocate applying Chevron in
foreign relations cases even when the executive branch is not exercis-
ing lawmaking authority and would not otherwise be entitled to such
deferential review. 394 While we agree with their methodological focus,
that analysis points toward normalization, not exceptionalism. Ac-
cordingly, for the reasons described above, 395 rather than apply Chev-
ron beyond its terms in administrative law, the better approach is to
apply standard Skidmore deference. Professors Derek Jinks and Neal
Katyal criticized Posner and Sunstein's approach, but they too fail to
advocate normalization. Rather, they argue that in the "executive-
constraining zone," which includes doctrines designed to restrict execu-
tive power, that deference should be restricted.396 In addition, they
suggest that Chevron should not apply in the absence of formal proce-
dures that incorporate the bureaucracy into decisionmaking. 397  It is
not obvious, however, why courts should apply either of these new
tests in foreign relations cases instead of simply applying standard ad-
ministrative law doctrines.
Although we think that normalization via black-letter administra-
tive law doctrines is possible, we harbor no illusions about the clarity
of administrative law in theory or practice. Scholars and judges have
long debated the desirability of virtually every administrative law doc-
trine, and empirical studies have shown that courts are hardly con-
sistent in applying administrative law doctrines. 3 9 Indeed, one schol-
ar has argued that problems with Chevron in administrative law
suggest that foreign relations should look elsewhere, to fundamental
questions about courts' institutional role. 399
393 See Criddle, supra note 372, at 1930.
394 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1205-07.
395 See supra pp. 1937-38.
396 See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 281, at 1235.
397 See id. at 1279.
398 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 25 1; Hickman & Krueger, supra
note 382; Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347
(2003).
399 Pearlstein, supra note 372, at 786-91.
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Still, we think these challenges are inapposite. First, contestation
itself is not an argument against normalization. Virtually every area of
law features deep disagreements among scholars or judges about doc-
trinal choices. That fact alone does not justify adopting a different le-
gal regime - which will have its own conflicts as well. Second, and
more importantly, the debates within administrative law doctrines have
nothing to do with the foreign versus domestic divide. Rather, they cut
to the heart of legal principles: the scope of delegation, the importance
of expertise, the sufficiency of process and reasoning, and the relation-
ship between Chevron and canons of interpretation. These questions
apply equally to foreign and domestic issues, as do the answers. Our
point is not that administrative law is clearer, simpler, or less debated
than foreign relations law - but rather that answers should not rely on
foreign relations exceptionalism. Normalizing deference means apply-
ing the same set of rules and principles in foreign and domestic affairs,
unless there are particular formal or specific functional differences on
the issue at hand. Declarations of blanket exceptionalism should no
longer be a justification for divergent treatment.
With our approach set out, we turn now to two additional issues:
the relationship between deference and presumptions, and the inter-
pretation of congressional enactments such as the Authorization for
Use of Military Force. Commentators have written extensively about
whether Chevron deference trumps various presumptions in both for-
eign relations and domestic law. While Bradley, Posner and Sunstein,
and Jinks and Katyal all come to different conclusions on this issue,
they all share a common approach: they consider the question only
with respect to foreign relations issues.40 0 Normalization suggests that
the appropriate question is whether these canons and presumptions (or
more precisely, each particular one) should triumph over Chevron or
Skidmore generally While there are debates about this question, 40 1
one's favored approach should apply with respect to both foreign and
domestic affairs.
Consider a few examples. The presumption against extraterritorial-
ity is sometimes defended on the grounds that it steers foreign policy
issues (but not domestic issues) away from courts and toward the polit-
ical branches, which are especially well-suited to resolve them, in part
because of the possibility of international discord. 40 2 The presumption
400 Sunstein might be an exception to this trend in his other work. See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CH. L. REV. 315 (2000).
401 For the general contours of the debates, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in
the Review of Administrative Policymaking, rr8 YALE L.J. 64 (2008). For a recent analysis of the
presumption against extraterritoriality, see Clopton, supra note 285.
402 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., '33 S. Ct. r659, r669 (2013) ("The presumption
against extraterritoriality guards against our courts triggering ... serious foreign policy conse-
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also rests on the claim that Congress generally legislates with domestic
rather than extraterritorial application in mind.40 3  The Charming
Betsy canon (which requires that, where possible, one interpret stat-
utes so they do not violate international law)40 4 might be defended as
allowing the political branches to make decisions on questions of for-
eign policy, because they have particular expertise in that area and be-
cause judicial expertise is weaker in foreign than domestic issueS. 40 5
But the Charming Betsy canon is also based on legislative intent; it
shares a common foundation with the presumption against implied re-
peal and the constitutional avoidance canon. 40 6  In other words, both
presumptions can be justified on exceptionalist grounds - that the ex-
ecutive is simply "better" and "knows more" about actions abroad and
international law. To the extent one believes that this is the justifica-
tion for the presumptions, one might believe that Chevron or perhaps
Skidmore should trump the presumptions. But we find these justifica-
tions for the presumptions relatively weak, both because of their high
level of generality and because of the existence of non-exceptionalist
justifications: formally, congressional intent, and functionally, the pref-
erence for simple decision rules. The formal justification would sug-
gest that the presumptions trump deference, while the non-
exceptionalist functional justifications could go either way. Our point
here is not to wade into the debate itself on the merits, but just to
stress that normalization suggests excising exceptionalist reasoning and
relying only on non-exceptionalist justifications.
Commentators have also written extensively on the interpretation
of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 40 7 (AUMF).40 8
Cass Sunstein argues that the AUMF is best read as a grant by Con-
quences, and instead defers such decisions, quite appropriately, to the political branches."); Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, '47 (1957) ("For us to run interference in ... a
delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Con-
gress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important poli-
cy decision where the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so
certain.").
403 See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, I6
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, go (1998) ("[O]nly the notion that Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind is a legitimate basis for the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
404 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 & n.i (1987).
405 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479, 525 (1998) ("The functional consid-
erations [supporting the canon] include the political branches' advantages vis-a-vis the courts in
obtaining foreign affairs information and in responding to changing world conditions.").
406 See id. at 529-33; Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International
Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 33'-32 (2005).
407 Pub. L. No. 107-40, ii5 Stat. 224 (20cr) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)).
408 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005).
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gress to the President of lawmaking authority and that Chevron defer-
ence therefore applies to executive interpretations of ambiguous
AUMF terms.40 9 Jinks and Katyal, concerned with executive branch
self-dealing, have argued that Chevron should not apply when a provi-
sion is meant to constrain the executive.4 10 We take a different view.
The normalization thesis suggests that whatever one's domestic theory
of Chevron, it should apply to the AUMF as it does to any other con-
gressional enactment. Thus, while it is true that the AUMF does not
include the explicit delegated rulemaking or adjudicatory power, one
might believe there is another "indication of a comparable congres-
sional intent"411 that justifies applying Chevron (as Sunstein does 4 12).
But, while we formally agree with Sunstein on this point, we disagree
with his apparent further suggestion that Chevron would apply even in
the absence of an interpretation that does not meet Mead's test.4 13 In
cases where Mead is not satisfied, normalization would require only
Skidmore deference. Jinks and Katyal have a harder case, as their ar-
gument relies on the "executive-constraining zone," which they appear
to root exclusively in foreign relations law. 414 The normalization thesis
would suggest that they would have to apply the executive-
constraining theory to domestic affairs as well. The concerns that
Jinks and Katyal raise are, however, reflected to some extent in the
Skidmore standard itself, which considers the quality of the process
used to make the agency decision and also indicia of self-dealing
(which can be analogized to agency litigating positions or other signs
of compromised decisionmaking).
2. Fact Deference. - Foreign relations cases often involve judicial
review of factual determinations made by the executive branch or by
the legislature. 415 In this context, too, normalization is not complete.
Consider two recent examples. The Court has accepted the govern-
ment's assessment that Iraqi prisons did not pose a serious prospect of
torture416 and that it is not possible to distinguish between a foreign
terrorist group's violent and nonviolent activities. 417 In both cases, the
Court emphasized the broad overall scope and significance of judicial
review, consistent with the normalization thesis, but also employed
exceptionalist reasoning when presented with questions of fact. More-
over, in one case the Court repeatedly noted that it was deferring to
409 See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 2663-64.
410 See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 281, at 1236-45.
411 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (20cr).
412 See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 2665-67.
413 See id. at 2665-66.
414 See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 281, at 1236-44.
415 See Chesney, supra note iig, at 1366.
416 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702-03 (2008).
417 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010).
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the judgment of both Congress and the executive, not the executive
branch alone. 418  The opinions are thus both normalized and
exceptionalist. Nevertheless, we join other commentators who have
suggested or explicitly argued that the Court erred in these two cases
by employing exceptionalist reasoning. Professor Aziz Huq maintains
that cases on counterterrorism should "become just another part of the
ordinary business of the federal courts '4 19 and that judges in these cas-
es "need to pay the same attention to factual predicates and specific
details about policies as they do in cases involving campaign finance,
affirmative action, or telecommunications policy."4 20 Professor Robert
Chesney has comprehensively evaluated what he calls "national securi-
ty fact deference" and similarly concluded that the optimal resolution
of deference questions is "deeply dependent on context. '42 1 Contrary
to both authors, however, we do not limit our analysis to counterter-
rorism or national security, but instead see the courts' treatment of
facts in these cases as one piece of a broader picture of foreign affairs
exceptionalism and the incomplete process of normalization. 4 22
Normalizing judicial review of executive factfinding still involves
determining what factors courts should consider or what standard
courts should employ. For facts determined during a formal adjudica-
tory process, courts review factfinding under a "substantial evidence"
test in ordinary administrative law,4 2 3 but this standard is not always
applicable because foreign affairs functions are exempted from formal
adjudicatory process requirements. 424  However, facts can also be
evaluated under the arbitrary and capricious review provision of APA
§ 7o6(2)(A) 425 and the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm.426 In-
deed, a number of commentators have shown that courts do apply ar-
bitrary and capricious review in a variety of national security cases,
and they have argued for wider application of the standard. 427  In
418 See id. ("[E]valuation of facts by the Executive, like Congress's assessment, is entitled to
deference.").
419 Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, Ioo CALIF. L. REV. 887,
949 (2O12).
420 Id. at 947.
421 Chesney, supra note i19, at 1435.
422 For a general discussion of these issues, see Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the Presi-
dent's Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1199-212 (2009) (arguing that the President's
claims of statutory power are subject to a version of ultra vires review).
423 5 U.S.C. § 7 o6(2)(E) (2012). For examples in the context of national security law, see
Vermeule, supra note 39, at 1121-22.
424 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4).
425 See id. § 7o6(2)(A).
426 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
427 For a discussion of direct application, see Vermeule, supra note 39, at II 9-21. For argu-
ments that the standard be expanded, see generally Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference
Playing Field, go OR. L. REV. 583 (2011) (arguing against expanded deference to the military);
Masur, supra note 137; and Sitaraman, supra note 318. It is worth noting that applying these
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some cases - for example, on the battlefield - administrative law
standards will not apply.428  Yet we do not believe this justifies
exceptionalist reasoning. Rather, courts should still seek to assess facts
as they would in analogous domestic situations.
To see how this might work, let us revisit Munaf v. Geren.429 Munaf
argued that he would be tortured if transferred to Iraqi custody 430 The
Court relied on exceptionalist reasoning to conclude that "[tihe Judicia-
ry is not suited to second-guess [the] determinations" of the State De-
partment.431 But it is not clear why the Court could not have evaluated
State's claim. The State Department could have presented an argu-
ment why it believed it was likely that the persons transferred to Iraqi
custody would not be tortured, and the Court could have assessed
whether State considered all the evidence and made a rational connec-
tion between the evidence and their ultimate conclusion. Indeed,
courts normally engage in this kind of analysis when the government
alleges that an entity supports terrorism. 432 It is not clear why the de-
termination that a foreign country engages in torture is so different in
kind from these cases that judicial review is impossible. 433
Similarly, consider the analysis in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project.434 In assessing the strength of the government's interest in the
material- support-for- terrorism statute, the Court considered whether
political advocacy activities were effectively fungible, enabling terror-
ist activities. 435  Congressional intent and factfinding partly answered
the question, but the Court also gave deference to facts claimed in an
affidavit submitted by the State Department, largely accepting them
standards to factfinding would not impose additional procedures on the executive branch. Under
Vermont Yankee, courts are prohibited from doing so. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). It is also worth clarifying that we mean
to disaggregate constitutional questions from this debate. Some factfinding may be assigned ex-
clusively to the President as a constitutional matter - such as determining who is the head of a
particular foreign state. And outside the administrative law context, there are situations in which
the executive branch may be acting pursuant to some mixture of delegated power and Article II
power. In the war on terror, for example, the extent to which the President's power is based on
the Constitution or instead on the AUMF is deeply contested.
428 The APA exempts military authority exercised on the battlefield. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(I)(G).
429 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
430 Id. at 700.
431 Id. at 702.
432 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3 d 156, 162-64 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
433 Indeed, this is precisely why other scholars have also suggested that fact deference need not
be treated so exceptionally. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note iig; Huq, supra note 419; Masur, supra
note 137.
434 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
435 Id. at 2725-27.
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without any scrutiny.436 In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the
government had not "explain[ed] in any detail how the plaintiffs'
political-advocacy-related activities might actually be 'fungible' and
therefore capable of being diverted to terrorist use. '4 37 The different
treatment of the State Department's affidavit by the majority and dis-
sent in Holder indicates how an arbitrariness review standard could
help eliminate exceptionalism. Instead of simply deferring to executive
factfinding for exceptionalist reasons, the Court could have, as Justice
Breyer hints, required the State Department to actually explain the
connection between the facts and the conclusion it drew. On this theo-
ry, the government would have had to do more than just submit an af-
fidavit; it would actually have had to explain why its position made
sense, consider the alternatives, and address counterarguments. Hu-
manitarian Law Project might still have lost, but the government
could not simply declare something a fact and then claim "national se-
curity" to gain deference for that claim's validity.
3. Treaties and Executive Agreements. - Courts have generally
given executive branch interpretations of treaties "great weight, '438 but
their reasons for doing so have varied. Normalizing the interpretation
of treaties and executive agreements would, we argue, provide a clear-
er basis for deference. The Supreme Court's treaty interpretation deci-
sions in the last decade have been divided, with deference granted to
executive branch interpretations in some cases but not in others. For
example, the Court explicitly relied on the executive branch's interpre-
tation in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,439 Abbott v. Abbott,4 40 and in part
in Medellin.44 1 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized in Sanchez-Llamas
that, "[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning giv-
en them by the departments of government particularly charged with
their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight. ' 44 2 This rea-
436 Id. at 2727. The Court noted that it had engaged in this same practice in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2oo8). Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
437 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
438 See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (i96i). The Court has normalized treaty
interpretation in other ways as well. For example, in BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina,
134 S. Ct. 1198 (2Q14), the Court interpreted the relevant treaty as if it were an "ordinary contract
between private parties." Id. at 12o6.
439 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2oo6).
440 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010).
441 See Medellfn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513, 525-26 (2008) (affording "great weight" to the ex-
ecutive branch's interpretation on the question of treaty self-execution, id. at 5 13 (quoting Sumi-
tomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (internal quotation mark omitted), but
not deferring to its argument that "the relevant treaties give the President the authority to imple-
ment the Avena judgment," id. at 525).
442 548 U.S. at 355 (alteration in original) (quoting Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 194) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993 ("It is well settled that the Executive Branch's
interpretation of a treaty 'is entitled to great weight."' (quoting Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185)). See
generally Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty
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soning might suggest a constitutional basis for deferring, or it could
mean simply that the government offers expertise and accountability
that the courts do not, making deference appropriate. Justice Kennedy
focused on the expertise-based rationale in Abbott, emphasizing that
"[t]he Executive is well informed concerning the diplomatic conse-
quences resulting from this Court's interpretation of 'rights of custo-
dy,' including the likely reaction of other contracting states and the
impact on the State Department's ability to reclaim children abducted
from this country. '443 The constitutional rationale was expressed by
Judge Randolph of the D.C. Circuit in his opinion in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld 444 (which then-Judge Roberts joined): "Under the Constitu-
tion, the President 'has a degree of independent authority to act' in
foreign affairs, and, for this reason and others, his construction and
application of treaty provisions is entitled to 'great weight.'
445
The normalization thesis readily supplies a framework for analysis.
If standard constitutional interpretation would afford a greater role for
the executive in treaty interpretation than in statutory interpretation,
deference would be warranted. But the constitutional argument has
been assumed in foreign relations cases, rather than proven - the rea-
soning in Sanchez-Llamas and Hamdan above provide examples. For
instance, assuming that the President has some independent authority
to act in foreign relations, a constitutionally based argument would
presumably have to identify the specific authority to act and then pro-
vide a theory as to why that authority bears on treaty interpretation,
which is otherwise committed to the courts under Article III. Consti-
tutional arguments aside, treaties and other international agreements
should be treated as ordinary law. Those that delegate authority, and
in which the executive acts pursuant to that authority, would get
Chevron deference, and executive interpretation absent such authority
would be eligible for Skidmore deference. 446 Deference to the execu-
tive in treaty cases based on an expertise justification would be ac-
counted for under Skidmore's deference test. Normalization does not
ignore legitimate functional concerns, but it also does not treat them as
sui generis - nor does it bolster them with underdeveloped constitu-
tional justifications.
Normalization also helps make sense of the Court's refusal to defer
to the executive branch on treaty interpretation questions in Hamdan
Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723 (2007) (chronicling the history of judicial deference to ex-
ecutive branch treaty interpretations).
443 Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993.
444 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
445 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003); and
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)).
446 See Criddle, supra note 372, at '933-34.
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and Medellin, where it ignored the "great weight" language from other
cases. Commentators argue that the two lines of cases are at odds.
44 7
But one possible distinction is that the Court does not afford the same
deference to the executive branch when the construction of the treaty is
dispositive with respect to an assertion of the executive branch's own
authority.44  Sanchez-Llamas involved no direct exercise of executive
power.449 But in the relevant part of Medellin, the executive relied up-
on the treaty as a basis for its asserted authority to compel Texas to
comply with the ICJ's Avena judgment.450  In Hamdan, interpretation
of the treaty was dispositive as to the executive branch's statutory au-
thority to use military commissions. 45 1  As discussed above, the intui-
tive problem of self-dealing provides reason to be skeptical of executive
interpretations in this context, in the same way that litigating positions
are viewed negatively in the Chevron context; Skidmore deference is
flexible enough to accommodate this consideration.
D. International Delegation as Normal Delegation
The early twentieth-century transformation of U.S. foreign relations
law began in earnest with a delegation case. 45 2 Today the courts have
largely normalized delegation doctrine, although some scholars argue
in favor of exceptionalism, especially when international organizations
or agreements are involved. We argue that standard administrative
and constitutional law principles adequately address these
concerns.
453
Standard separation of powers doctrine prohibits Congress from
delegating legislative power to private entities 454 and from delegating
447 See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 442, at 1732-33.
448 Note the parallel to City of Arlington v. FCC. See supra pp. 1934-35.
449 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006).
450 See Medellfn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503 (2008); see also Avena and Other Mexican Nation-
als (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 IC.J. 12, 72 (Mar. 3).
451 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623 (2006). Only Justices Scalia and Thomas thought
that the executive branch should receive deference on the treaty interpretation question, based on
the President's authority as Commander in Chief and chief executive of the United States, sup-
ported in part with a citation to Curtiss- Wright. See id. at 719 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas also argued that under the Court's precedents, "the meaning attributed to treaty provi-
sions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to
great weight." Id. at 718 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85
(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority accepted neither argument.
452 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The year before, the
Court had struck down domestic legislation because it delegated too much lawmaking discretion
to the President. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42
(1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418-19 (1935).
453 For a welfarist argument that international delegation should be treated as normal delega-
tion, see Note, International Delegation as Ordinary Delegation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1042 (2012).
454 See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 721 F.3 d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacat-
ed on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
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to the executive branch without an "intelligible principle" set out in the
statute itself.455  In contemporary practice, courts rarely find a viola-
tion of either axiom in foreign relations cases or in domestic cases. 456
Courts continue to suggest, however, that the second principle applies
with less force in foreign relations cases, based on both functional rea-
soning and constitutional analysis. The constitutional argument,
which is not necessarily exceptionalist, is that broader congressional
delegations are permissible when the President is also exercising inde-
pendent constitutional authority.457  The functionalist argument is,
however, exceptionalist: "[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive na-
ture of contemporary international relations" and the executive's speed
and access to information, "Congress - in giving the Executive au-
thority over matters of foreign affairs - must of necessity paint with a
brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas. ' 458
This reasoning is invoked most often in statutory interpretation, as
discussed above, 459 but it is also used to justify the relaxation of consti-
tutional nondelegation principles. The clearest contemporary example
is the Court's 1996 decision Loving v. United States460 in which the
Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to the President's prescrip-
tion of aggravating factors used to impose the death penalty in a court-
martial proceeding. 461 Even in Loving, however, exceptionalism took a
back seat to standard delegation principles, causing Justice Thomas to
write separately. His concurrence, joined by no other Justice, argued
that the decision should be based entirely on the exceptional nature of
military affairs, without reliance on domestic separation of powers is-
sues. 462 Today, the functional foundations for this argument have been
(striking down a statute that required coal producers to accept the maximum hours and wages
negotiated by a group of producers and mine workers).
455 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406-07 (1928); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892).
456 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 53' U.S. 457, 472-76 (20cr); see also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUS1. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-33 (1980).
457 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996); United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975); cf. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Pow-
er, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2290-91 (2006) (arguing that the President has a transsubstantive power
to complete statutory schemes). Lower courts tend to mix constitutional and exceptionalist rea-
soning. See, e.g., United States v. Chi Tong Kuok, 671 F.3 d 931, 938-39 (9 th Cir. 2012).
458 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (i98i) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 17 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
459 See, e.g., id.; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17.
460 517 U.S. 748.
461 Id. at 758.
462 Id. at 777-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There is abundant authority for
according Congress and the President sufficient deference in the regulation of military affairs to
uphold the delegation here, and I see no need to resort to our nonmilitary separation-of-powers
and 'delegation doctrine' cases in reaching this conclusion.").
20151 I197I1
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
undercut by the Court's overall rejection of foreign affairs
exceptionalism.
Other standard separation of powers principles also apply to dele-
gations of foreign affairs-related authority. For example, there are
limits on the power of administrative agencies to "subdelegate" their
authority.463 Due process, the Appointments Clause, and Article II
limitations are also relevant to both domestic and international delega-
tions.4 64 Finally, as Curtis Bradley has argued, most delegations relat-
ed to international law and international organizations do not involve
the power to make or interpret law that is binding within the U.S. le-
gal system, which diminishes the accountability and democracy-based
concerns associated with delegations. 465 Where there is uncertainty
about the scope of intended delegation, courts generally assume that
the actions of international organizations and tribunals are not judi-
cially enforceable in U.S. courts,4 66 a principle that is consistent with
the Court's general approach of interpreting statutes to avoid delega-
tion problems. 46
7
Despite the trend toward normalization in the doctrine, academic
arguments for delegation-related foreign affairs exceptionalism are
common, especially in the contexts of international decisionmaking
and international organizations. Some argue that these kinds of del-
egations should be held to a more relaxed standard than domestic dele-
gations, based on the old exceptionalist reasoning that foreign relations
issues require greater speed and flexibility.468 Others maintain that the
accountability and democracy-based arguments against delegations
apply with particular force when power is delegated to international
organizations, perhaps warranting greater scrutiny from the courts -
exceptionalism in the other direction. 4 69 The case for exceptionalism -
in either direction - seems exaggerated, however. The courts' some-
463 See Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3 d 913, 925-28 (D.C. Cir. 2008); David Zaring,
Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 9i WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 84-87 (2013).
464 See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
(2013) (exploring the intersection of international and domestic law).
465 Id.
466 See id. at 134-64; see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3 d i, io (D.C. Cir. 2006)
("We need not confront the 'serious likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional.' It is
far more plausible to interpret the Clean Air Act and Montreal Protocol as creating an ongoing
international political commitment rather than a delegation of lawmaking authority to annual
meetings of the Parties." (citations omitted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 238 (1998))).
467 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989); John F. Manning, The
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 223; Sunstein, supra note
232, at 244-47.
468 See Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 33, at 770-73.
469 See Edward T. Swaine, Resisting International Delegations, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
343 (2004).
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what narrow interpretation of delegations to international organiza-
tions (along with constitutional limitations including the prohibition on
delegations to private entities) has effectively avoided many of the de-
mocracy and accountability problems that might arguably arise other-
wise.4 7 0  But interpreting delegations narrowly leads to the concern
that courts are overenforcing constitutional norms through avoid-
ance 47 1 - a concern that arguably imposes increasing costs on policy-
making as administrative agencies attempt to coordinate with their
counterparts through soft-law agreements. 47
2
Professors Jean Galbraith and David Zaring have argued that for-
eign affairs exceptionalism should be applied to delegations that in-
volve "soft" or nonbinding international agreements, so that "Ameri-
ca's regulators ...[can] be permitted to continue working with their
foreign counterparts. '473 In support, the authors argue that the Clean
Diamond Trade Act (CDTA) and U.S. participation in the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) are restricted
by standard nondelegation doctrine, demonstrating the need for an
exceptionalist approach.4 7 4 But these examples appear largely unprob-
lematic under standard doctrine. ICANN, for example, is said by
some to pose private-entity delegation issues,4 75 but other scholars dis-
agree. 4 76  Even those advancing the argument admit its weaknesses,
especially in light of the generally relaxed approach courts have taken
to post-New Deal delegations. 4 77 Most tellingly, perhaps, no court has
accepted this argument in the decade and a half since it was first ad-
vanced. The CDTA allows the President to waive its provisions in the
interest of national security and it also includes a trigger based on ac-
tions by international organizations, interpreted by the President as a
grant of discretion to him.478  But waivers and triggers are common
features of domestic legislation and it is unclear that standard delega-
tion principles would invalidate them. 479
470 See BRADLEY, supra note 464, at 136-37.
471 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 8cc, 816 (1983).
472 See, e.g., Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 33, at 754-55.
473 Id. at 74'.
474 Id. at 778-84 (arguing that courts should use an exceptionalist approach to evaluate delega-
tion issues raised by the CDTA and ICANN).
475 See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 5o DUKE L.J. i7, 20 (2000).
476 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce's Contract Delegation of Power to ICANN, 6
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1 (2002).
477 See Kathleen E. Fuller, An Interview with Michael Froomkin, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 00cr, 12, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dltr/volI/issI/2 [http://perma.cc/SBQ9-GZWR].
478 Edward Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1519-20, 16io (2004).
479 See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 141, at 312-24.
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More fundamentally, to the extent that standard nondelegation doc-
trine might invalidate some aspect of the effort to implement soft law,
it is because the standard concerns associated with delegation - ac-
countability and democracy - apply in the foreign affairs context as
well.4 0  Galbraith and Zaring offer no real argument for soft-law
exceptionalism except that agencies need flexibility. Their concrete ex-
amples do not show that current regulatory efforts are stymied by tra-
ditional doctrine, however, and they offer little to support the claim
that agencies need more discretion in foreign relations than domestic
cases.
E. Normalizing Foreign Official Immunity and State Secrets
In some areas, normalization would be best furthered by Congress
passing legislation explicitly delegating rulemaking authority to an ex-
ecutive agency, or short of that, by the agency promulgating rules even
in the absence of a new congressional enactment. Perhaps the best ex-
amples are foreign official immunity determinations and the state se-
crets doctrine. Although these two areas of law are rarely considered
together, they have structural similarities. Both are judicially created
doctrines, both are partially based on contested exceptionalist and con-
stitutional grounds, both may be invoked in litigation between private
parties in which no other agency action is at issue, and both are
controversial.
Consider immunity first. Determinations of foreign state immunity
were traditionally made by courts applying international law. But as
part of the early twentieth-century transformation in foreign relations
law, the Supreme Court held with little analysis that courts are bound
by executive determinations of immunity.4 1l If the State Department
made no such determination, courts were bound to follow whatever
general immunity principles the executive branch had developed. This
system did not work well. It led to unwanted pressure on the State
Department from foreign sovereigns, to the perception that the De-
partment made immunity decisions based on political rather than legal
grounds, to a lack of certainty as to the substance of the law, and to
concerns about the due process rights of the parties because the State
Department had no formal procedure for deciding immunity claims.4 2
480 Compare Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on the Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 359, 359-6o (1947), with Swaine, supra note 469.
481 See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945); Ex parte Republic of Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943); see also Wuerth, supra note gi, at 924-26.
482 Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Govern-
ment Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1144-45 (20ff); see also Michael H.
Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 6o8,
613-14 (1954).
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As a result, at the request of the State Department, the FSIA was en-
acted and courts were again tasked with making immunity determina-
tions, 4 3 now pursuant to statutory criteria.
But in recent years, State Department immunity determinations
have returned. In 2010, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA does
not govern the immunity of individual foreign officials. 4 4 Today, the
State Department claims the power to make foreign official immunity
determinations that are binding on courts, based on early twentieth-
century cases against foreign sovereigns and on broad, exceptionalist
reasoning. 4 5  The State Department makes contemporary immunity
determinations in the form of either "suggestions of immunity"4 6 or
"statements of interest. '4 7 The suggestions and statements are both
legal and factual, in the sense that they state what the executive
branch believes the law is or should be and that they determine
whether an individual qualifies for immunity under those legal princi-
ples. Lower courts have struggled to determine what deference, if any,
is due to these executive branch submissions.4 8  While the twentieth-
century cases and exceptionalist arguments for executive power may
be unconvincing, the executive branch nevertheless has expertise and
information that is obviously relevant to immunity determinations.
Normalization helps resolve this issue. Although we are skeptical
about the constitutional arguments, 4 9 if generally applicable constitu-
tional analysis accords the President the power to make immunity de-
terminations binding on the courts, 490 then when such determinations
are made they must be binding, assuming they are not otherwise un-
constitutional or contrary to law. 491 If the President lacks this power,
however, Congress could authorize the State Department to engage in
rulemaking to establish generally applicable principles for individual
official immunity determinations and even an adjudicatory process to
apply the facts to these situations.
Congress has a variety of options for setting standards. Congress
could simply set out substantive immunity law by statute, as it has
done for foreign sovereigns. But given the unsettled state of the inter-
483 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2O12).
484 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010).
485 Wuerth, supra note 9i, at 918 & n.9, 934 & n.I14.
486 See John B. Bellinger III, The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations on the Past, Present,
and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts Immunities, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 829 (2011).
487 Id. at 831.
488 See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3 d 763, 768-73 (4 th Cir. 2012).
489 See Wuerth, supra note 91, at 931-35 (reviewing and analyzing constitutional arguments).
490 This might include congressional authorization or acquiescence. See id. at 939-42.
491 Several lower courts have held that foreign sovereigns do not have due process rights. See,
e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3 d 82, 96-97 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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national law of immunity and the important effect that U.S. law and
policy can have on the formation of international law, Congress might
instead give the agency the power to develop substantive rules of im-
munity. While this is an unconventional suggestion in the ongoing de-
bate over sovereign immunity, it is natural from the normalization per-
spective. Congress would require the State Department to issue
regulations governing individual official immunity determinations.
This regime could follow the standard notice-and-comment processes
in § 553 of the APA - or it could modify, or even exclude, those re-
quirements. If Congress took this approach, then the agency would
get Chevron deference concerning any relevant questions of statutory
interpretation, and its substantive immunity provisions would be sub-
ject to arbitrary and capricious review. 492 These immunity rules would
then bind the courts as they made case-by-case immunity decisions. 493
In court, the State Department's factual determinations would be sub-
ject to arbitrary and capricious review (unless Article II's recognition
power were at issue) and its interpretative suggestions would be given
Chevron or Skidmore deference depending on whether its interpreta-
tion was promulgated as a rule with the force of law.494
Congress could also give the State Department the power to initial-
ly adjudicate immunity cases. Congress could require formal agency
adjudication, for example, 495 which would involve a formal, adversar-
ial hearing, as it does in administrative law.496  To be sure, this ap-
proach would impose significant costs on the State Department and
reintroduce the problem of pressure on the State Department from ag-
grieved foreign governments. In addition, under a grant of authority
from Congress, the State Department could also engage in informal
adjudications of foreign official immunity, which would result in an
order and would be reviewed to ensure the order was not arbitrary or
capricious. 49 7 There is some precedent for informal agency determina-
492 See 5 U.S.C. § 7 o6(2)(A) (2012).
493 See id. § 551(4) ("'[R]ule' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy .... ").
494 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (20cr).
495 See 5 U.S.C. § 554.
496 See, e.g., id. § 556.
497 Under the APA, an "adjudication" means an "agency process for the formulation of an or-
der," id. § 551(7), and an "order" means "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether af-
firmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule
making but including licensing," id. § 551(6). The latter definition could include immunity de-
terminations, assuming there is not a requirement for formal adjudication procedures pursuant to
88 556 and 557. Informal adjudications are subject to arbitrary and capricious review. Id.
§ 7o6(2)(A).
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tions along these lines from the pre-FSIA days,498 although they were
understood as binding on the courts as a constitutional matter.
This course of action would improve decisionmaking about foreign
official immunity in several ways. First, immunity determinations are
currently governed by federal common law, with an ill-defined defer-
ence to the executive. Rulemaking would standardize the applicable
law and process available within the State Department, heading off
claims of differential treatment based on political factors, in turn di-
minishing the political pressure on the State Department. Second, it
would clarify the deference to which agency determinations are enti-
tled. Third, it would take advantage of the considerable expertise of
the State Department with respect to immunity, while at the same time
allowing courts to oversee the decisionmaking to ensure that the agen-
cy considered the relevant evidence and did not act arbitrarily. Final-
ly, it would afford substantial deference to agency determinations. As
in other contexts, agencies may choose more extensive procedures in
order to receive more deference from reviewing courts.499
The state secrets privilege could likewise be improved along similar
lines. The privilege is a common law evidentiary procedure that al-
lows the government to withhold evidence that, if disclosed, would
threaten national security.5 00 It has been invoked recently in a series
of high-profile post-9/II cases challenging the conduct of the U.S. gov-
ernment; the government has also invoked the privilege in private liti-
gation.5 01  The Supreme Court has emphasized the evidentiary nature
of the privilege, rather than basing the privilege on constitutional or
exceptionalist grounds.5 0 2  Lower courts, however, have applied the
doctrine broadly at the request of the Bush and Obama Administra-
tions, dismissing entire cases based in part on foreign affairs
exceptionalism.5 0 3  These uses of the privilege have generated much
498 Under pre-FSIA practice, both the plaintiff and the foreign government could submit mem-
oranda on the immunity issue, and either party could request a conference before a panel of State
Department attorneys. These conferences did not include the taking of evidence or testimony and
no transcripts were made. Bellinger III, supra note 486, at 832 & n.8o.
499 See Stephenson, supra note 374, at 552-53.
500 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953).
501 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE REPORT (2011), http://fas.org
/sgp/jud/statesec/doj -ssp.pdf [http://perma.cc/3M8A-MK2 L].
502 See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. i9oo, 1905-o6 (2011) (emphasizing
with respect to Reynolds that "[flederal discovery rules, then as now, did not require production of
documents protected by an evidentiary privilege," id. at 19o5, and that "[Reynolds] decided a
purely evidentiary dispute by applying evidentiary rules," id. at i9o6); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3 d
'39, i5i (D.C. Cir. 2007). But see Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 n.9 (explaining that the executive's
"power to suppress documents is based ... [on] an inherent executive power which is protected in
the constitutional system").
503 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303-ii (4 th Cir. 2007); cf. Memorandum
from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator William H. Frist, Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security
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criticism and are sometimes analogized to the political question
doctrine.50 4
Efforts to reform the privilege should be understood as attempts to
normalize it. Proposals before Congress have sought, for example, to
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide both substantive and
procedural limitations on the privilege. Government affidavits stand-
ing alone would provide insufficient basis for granting the privilege;
courts would instead be required to examine the underlying evidence
in camera. The review of evidence in camera is similar to the process
mandated by the Classified Intelligence Procedures Act,5 0 5 as are other
elements of the proposed legislation.5 0 6 Attorney General Eric Holder,
responding to criticism of the Obama Administration's reliance on the
privilege, has normalized state secrets in a different way: by providing
clearer agency guidelines for determining when to invoke the privilege.
These reforms were put in place in October 2009 and include substan-
tive standards for invoking the privilege and a more formalized pro-
cess that involves the head of the agency or department that seeks to
sue for the privilege, the Attorney General, and a State Secrets Review
Committee.5 0 7  Other authors have proposed additional reforms that
would further normalize the privilege by introducing more structured
decisionmaking by the agency 5 081 Although we take no position on the
relative merits of these specific proposals, including whether they go
far enough, all are administrative law-based reforms that would im-
prove agency decisionmaking and diminish the role of foreign affairs
exceptionalism in the invocation and application of the privilege.
CONCLUSION
Professor Henkin captured the prevailing wisdom of the twentieth
century when he wrote in I996 that "the Court has not said much
Agency Described by the President 7 (Jan. 19, 2oo6), http://www.justice.gov/opa
/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [http://perma.cc/8649-4QWC].
504 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1955 (2007).
505 Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (ig8o) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16
(2012)).
506 Jared Cole, Note, Historical Gloss and Congressional Power: Control over Access to Nation-
al Security Secrets, 99 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1870 (2Q13).
507 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts & Agencies, Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege
(Sept. 23, 2oo9), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf [http://perma.cc
/KK 7 D-2BGZ].
508 Beth George, Note, An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State Secrets Privi-
lege, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. i6gi, i6gi (2009) ("By making invocation of the privilege more adminis-
tratively burdensome and by putting the professional credibility of officials who may not benefit
from its use on the line, the reforms proposed here would more effectively discourage overreach-
ing in the state secrets privilege context.").
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about foreign affairs and promises to say little more. '50 9 In the de-
cades since the end of the Cold War, however, the Court has said a
great deal about foreign affairs. Perhaps surprisingly, most of what it
has said is that foreign relations law is not so exceptional after all.
Scholars too have come to the same conclusion. To be sure, there are
still outliers and there is still much unfinished business. But scholars
and courts should embrace normalization as the new paradigm for for-
eign relations law. It is exceptionalism that is now exceptional.
509 HENKIN, supra note 103, at 4; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over
Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529 (1999).
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